Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts

11 May 2008

From FARC to Venezuela to...

With the initial confirmation that the information on the computer captured by Colombia in its fight against FARC are legitimate, and INTERPOL has yet to weigh in on the data, there is one part that stands out in the Wall Street Journal report of 09 MAY 2008 by Jose de Cordoba and Jay Solomon:

One email, apparently sent by a FARC commander known as "Timochenko" to the guerrillas' ruling body in March 2007, describes meetings with Venezuelan naval-intelligence officers who offer the FARC assistance in getting "rockets." The Venezuelans also offer to help a FARC guerrilla travel to the Middle East to learn how to use the rockets.

Colombian military analysts believe the reference is to shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, a weapon that the guerrillas desperately need if they hope to blunt Colombia's recent gains. "The FARC realizes that its military problem is air power," says Gen. Oscar Naranjo, who heads the country's national police.

This is one of those times where all that previous work on organized crime, international arms sales and such comes in handy! Looking up for one of the first hits on FARC and the Middle East we come to one of the very interconnected individuals in this realm: Monzer al-Kassar! This from the Kesher Talk archives of 22 MAR 2002 looking at an overseas assassination(unfortunately the UPI link is dead):

Lebanese multimillionaire's death stirs controversy: Michael Youssef Nassar, 39, a Lebanese multimillionaire, died earlier this week in Sao Paulo in a gangland-style slaying. Police are stymied not by a lack of suspects, but rather, that there are so many. While there is some speculation that Nassar was silenced by the Israelis because of his involvement with the Lebanese Christian militia's massacres in the Palestinian Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps in 1982, a report on the Lebanese Foundation for Peace Web site claims that Nassar and his wife were killed by Hezbollah. Nassar's fiscal dealings were sufficiently convoluted that he was under investigation by the intelligence services of the United States, Britain, France and Israel at the time of his death. His shady dealings during his six years in Brazil attracted the attention of the local authorities, impressed by his 300 percent profits on his real estate holdings. Nassar enriched himself enormously in the aftermath of the end of the Lebanese civil war, when he and his business partner Syrian Monzer al Kassar supplied surplus Falangist weaponry to eager clients ranging from Colombia's FARC rebels to the Taliban. Fleeing Lebanon in fear of his life, Nassar first went to Romania, where he got involved in cigarette smuggling. Brazilian investigators are seeking leads among the country's 7 million Lebanese immigrants, but are making little headway, where the average immigrant admires Nassar's ability to compile a $200 million fortune in his brief 39-year life. (United Press International: UPI hears ...)

From one man's death comes many connections, but with Hezbollah looking to take him out, and all his crossing of international problems there is one man who gets very connected then and now, and that is Monzer al-Kassar. And with the involvement of al-Kassar a Hezbollah rub-out comes distinctly possible as it could be 'just business' to sell out Nassar by al-Kassar as he has close ties to Hezbollah. That is due to the city of Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley as described in this WorldNetDaily report of 30 JUL 2000 by Anthony LoBaido:

Some of these soldiers will maintain the Syrian radar net that dots the landscape. Others will serve as overlords to the various heroin-cultivating outposts in the region. Still others will serve as advisers at a multitude of terrorist training camps quartering bad boys from the four corners of the Earth.

From Armenia, Palestine, Japan, North Korea, Turkey and India they have come -- disaffected paramilitary groups ready to take up arms for what they perceive to be right and just.

[..]

Posters and pictures of Hizbollah leaders Ayatollah Khomeini and Hassan Nasrallah -- and even a museum display under the temple ruins of Hizbollah's military adventures -- are a paramount feature of Baalbeck. (WorldNetDaily also found several posters featuring photos of Michael Jackson and Madonna. The posters call for their summary execution for "moral crimes" against humanity and offer a $10 million reward paid in gold bullion). The town serves as the headquarters of Hizbollah or "The Party of God," the Syria- and Iran-backed terror group that has pestered Israel mercilessly since the party's inception in the early 1980s.

In a page out of Alan Greenspan's worst nightmare, Shiite Muslims, with the help of Iranian special intelligence agents, are frantically printing "Supernotes" -- U.S. hundred-dollar bills that rival North Korea's for their counterfeiting excellence. German marks are also counterfeited in the Bekaa.

Syria's role in the Bekaa goes back to January 6, 1976. Ironically, Syria had joined up with Lebanon's Christian Phalange against the Palestinians and other Muslims in Lebanon's internecine conflict. Abu Nidal and his terrorist friends then started attacking Syrian positions in response to Syria's siding with the Christians. In short order, Syrian troops and their brutal secret police destroyed Lebanon's elected government of Michel Aoun and implemented a campaign of media censorship and police-state tactics.

Countless millions of dollars are siphoned off from Lebanon and into Syria on an annual basis. Lebanon cannot export any goods into Syria, while on the other hand, Syria can unload an unregulated amount of goods onto the Lebanese market.

A harvest of opium

Larry Martines, a professor and terrorism expert who works with the U.S. government, told WorldNetDaily: "The Bekaa Valley is home to a great deal of heroin cultivation. It is controlled by the Syrian military. If they, even for one second, think that you are a DEA agent, you will simply disappear."

The Bekaa Valley is fertile and well designed for the cultivation of opium poppies. Rifat Assad, the brother of recently deceased Syrian President Hafez Assad, was well known as the head honcho who ran the Syrian drug operation in the Bekaa. The 30,000 Syrian troops he dispatched to the Bekaa are a testament to the monetary importance of heroin as a cash crop.

According to the Mossad intelligence officer interviewed by WorldNetDaily in Zahlah, "The CIA has made a secret deal to protect the Syrian drug pipeline. This was done vis-à-vis promises that the Syrians (led by El-Khassar) would help to get American hostages released from captivity in Lebanon. One agreement, as everyone now knows, involved 'CIA One.' They protected the Syrian-Bekaa drug flow from Lebanon through the airport in Frankfurt, Germany, and into the United States. The DEA was also involved, mainly for purposes of plausible deniability.

"I remember when the Defense Intelligence Agency group working out of Beirut led by Maj. Charlie McKee had a devil of a time trying to track and rescue the U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon. We kept trying to explain to him why he wasn't getting the cooperation he needed from the other U.S. agencies. But in the end, everyone found out about 'CIA One.' Talk about your dances with wolves."

[..]

The number of terror groups receiving training in the Bekaa is stupefying. For example, there's the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. It is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group formed in 1975. The group's goal is to force the government of Turkey to publicly admit its guilt for the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians killed back in 1915. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia wants monetary compensation as well as their own homeland. The group's leader, Hagop Hagopian, was assassinated in Greece in 1998.

The Japanese Red Army is also operating in the Bekaa, led by Fusako Shigenobu. The Red Army wants to overthrow the Japanese government and monarchy. Chemists and agricultural high-tech experts from Japan's Om Shin Ri Kyo cult are also sporadically posted in the Bekaa. Their expertise and elite scientific training are highly prized by groups wanting to gain skills in biological and biochemical warfare.

Perhaps the best-armed and most well-trained group in the Bekaa Valley is the Kurdish Workers Party. They want to set up a Marxist state in southeast Turkey where a large population of Kurds reside.

The new kids on the block in the Bekaa are from India. Their new anti-Christian terror cult of Ganesh -- a common Hindu god -- is central to the new "Hindu Awakening" of the 1990s. These soldiers and anti-Christian terrorists are known as the "Munnani." They hail from the New Age capital of Madras and are seeking to get hold of an atomic bomb, according to intelligence and terrorism experts.

Having contacts with FARC in that cross-pollinating atmosphere that is 'training for payment' regardless of affiliation, makes them a 'natural' especially as al-Kassar would come calling in Argentina in the late 1980's. This connection would show up to finally catch Monzer al-Kassar in 2007, as Chris Thompson from Consulado General Central Colombia New York would report on 24 JUL 2007:

On February 6, two representatives from the infamous Colombian left-wing paramilitary and drug-trafficking group FARC arrived at a palatial Renaissance estate in Marbella, Spain. While their compadres squatted in the jungle, the two soaked up the Mediterranean opulence of the place, noticing the pool shaped like a four-leaf clover and the mastiffs that patrolled the grounds each night. Their host, a 62-year-old Syrian named Monzer al-Kassar, a/k/a the "Prince of Marbella," has been known to entertain visitors with lamb and dolmas beneath murals of turbaned African servants. But they hadn't come for the cuisine. They were there to talk about killing Americans.

For 30 years, Monzer al-Kassar has been linked to some of history's most notorious international arms deals and terrorist atrocities. He has been accused of aiding in the attempted assassination of an Israeli spy; supplying the weapons used in the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro luxury liner; and seeding the Somali and Bosnian civil wars with countless AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. Swiss and Spanish officials have repeatedly tried to prosecute him for murder and money laundering, and a small group of private investigators, in conjunction with the United Nations and such groups as Human Rights Watch, have worked to expose his international network of offshore companies, crooked port officials, and Eastern European arms manufacturers. Each time, Kassar beat the rap and returned to his hacienda on the Spanish coast.

At this point Monzer al-Kassar is *still* in Spain with Syria threatening Spain and the US if we don't let him go. Once these FARC representatives told Kassar what they needed, he got to work:

Kassar allegedly promised that "his fight was also with the United States," and got on the phone to secure a few price quotes from contacts in Romania and Yugoslavia. For the cost of up to $8 million, Kassar said, he'd even throw in a small army of mercenaries and train the FARC in how to build improvised explosive devices.

Needless to say this was a 'sting' operation, but his ability to outwit the Spanish legal system and keep himself in Spain, amongst his many contacts, means that his organization is still hard at work. The interesting thing to notice is that beyond the weapons wanted, assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, RPGs and lots of ammo, al-Kassar had quick contacts in the terror community to add in IED training for *free*. That sort of thing normally, one would expect, does not come cheaply, and yet he can guarantee it 'on the spot' and that they would be part of the package deal. That report then goes on to detail much of the major arms deals of al-Kassar, including the North/Secord/Hakim one in Iran/Contra (even though he would claim "I'm not that cheap"! Heh.) and his ability to deliver arms to places under embargo like Somalia. This would include the Israeli Embassy bombing and AMIA Jewish Cultural Center bombings in Argentina which would link Hezbollah to the western hemisphere as seen in this look at the Tri-Border Area of South America by Lt. Col. Philip K. Abbott in the SEP-OCT 2004 issue of Military Review [footnote citations removed]:

Argentine officials believe Hezbollah is active in the TBA. They attribute the detonation of a car bomb outside Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires on 17 March 1992 to Hezbollah extremists. Officials also maintain that with Iran's assistance, Hezbollah carried out a car-bomb attack on the main building of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994 in protest of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement that year.

In May 2003, Argentine prosecutors linked Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu to the AMIA bombing and issued arrest warrants for two Lebanese citizens in Ciudad del Este. An Iranian intelligence officer who defected to Germany told Argentine prosecutors that Imad Mugniyah was the principal suspect in the Buenos Aires bombings. U.S. officials consider Mugniyah the mastermind of the 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which suggests he has direct ties to Hezbollah and Iran. Argentine Jews (and many non-Jews) reportedly feel former Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem, of Syrian ancestry, accepted a bribe to conceal Iran's role in the bombings. Although we cannot confirm the growing radicalization of Islamic communities in the TBA, we must take the possibility into account and closely monitor the situation.

Al-Qaeda is a network of terrorist groups scattered all over the world with a presence in practically every country. Are Osama bin-Laden's operatives also present in the TBA? Local and international media have written about al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups setting up training camps in the TBA and even having secret summit meetings in the area, although intelligence and law-enforcement officials have not corroborated these reports. The governments of the three TBA countries say terrorism is not a problem in the region and emphasize that they have never detected terrorist activity or cells there. In December 2002, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the United States agreed that "no concrete, detailed tactical information . . . support[s] the theory that there are terrorist sleeper cells or al-Qaeda operatives in the TBA."

Even so, U.S. and regional officials worry that illegal activity and commerce in the area fund terrorist groups, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah relies extensively on Islamic money through the common Arab community practice of remitting funds to relatives in the Middle East. In addition, with the complicity of corrupt local officials, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) paid Brazilian and Paraguayan organized criminal groups to obtain weapons and equipment in exchange for cocaine.

[..]

The TBA's exact role in attracting terrorist groups is not entirely clear, but Ciudad del Este's Arab and Muslim community has raised funds through money laundering, illicit drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling, and piracy, with some of the funds reportedly going to Hezbollah and Hamas to support terrorist acts against Israel. The FARC also reportedly maintains a fundraising presence in the TBA. This extensive terrorist financial network also stretches to Margarita Island, Panama, and the Caribbean.

The TBA's dangerous combination of vast ungoverned areas, poverty, illicit activity, disenfranchised groups, ill-equipped law-enforcement agencies and militaries, and fragile democracies is an open invitation to terrorists and their supporters. Undeterred criminal activity, economic inequality, and the rise of disenfranchised groups with the potential to collaborate with terrorists present a daunting challenge.

Terrorism today is transnational and decentralized. International support of a multidimensional counterterrorism strategy is necessary to defeat it. Colombia's less-than-successful counternarcotics strategy demonstrates that unilateral action does not necessarily eradicate or eliminate drug trafficking. The same is true of terrorism. Unilateral action in Afghanistan has not eliminated the global terrorist threat. Without multilateral, cooperative deterrence, terrorist organizations will simply migrate across porous borders to less scrutinized areas. As long as terrorism does not directly affect them, nations in the TBA will place economic considerations ahead of security concerns, seek economic prosperity, and remain reluctant to tighten border controls or place new restrictions on commerce and transportation.

One does not need active terrorist cells to have a terrorist presence in an area: funding and logistics are just as important to terrorist activities as they are to normal military organizations or business activities. Looking at a report by Alessia De Caro from Online Gnosis of JAN 2006 we get this view of what had happened in transnational terrorism in and around Colombia:

Although the Party of God is strenuously employed in Lebanon in the organization of agricultural formation courses, in an attempt to face the re-conversion of the hashish and poppy plantations, prohibited by the Lebanese State, in 1992, Hizbollah has never concerned itself with the illegal ways in which its members have procured the funds to sustain the organization. On the contrary, the drug trafficking profits, which arrive from Latin America, have always been used to solve the social problems of the Lebanese people, in order to win consensus in the country.

Affiliates and cells of Hizbollah are also active in Colombia and Venezuela; the weak governments of these areas and the loose and often uncontrolled borders, have favoured such a phenomenon.

Furthermore, the diffused narcoterrorism in that region is due to the liaison between Hizbollah and the local opposition terrorist groups such as, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

In the wake of the Hizbollah-Columbian example, links with the 'Sendero Luminoso', in Peru, have also been created.

The anti-American ideology, common to these organizations and, above all, the interest in smuggling and other illegal activities to accumulate funds have, substantially, united these different groups.

The level of cooperation between Hizbollah and these groups is still not clear even though it is important to note that in January of 2004, on the occasion of an exchange of prisoners between the Israeli authorities and Hizbollah, Ali Biro was freed: he was a Hizbollah militant and one of the most renowned Middle East drug traffickers connected with FARC.

With regard to the implications of Hizbollah in drug trafficking, one of the most recent arrests in this field, was made by the Paraguayan police in May, 2003. The man arrested was Hassan Dayub, while he was trying to send to Syria, an electric pianola, filled with cocaine. Dayub is a relative of the already mentioned Assad Barakat.

[..]

In Latin America, Hizbollah could supply ever increasing logistic and financial support, not only to Al Qaeda, but also to local groups and extend the terrorist targets from the national interests to western and American interests within and outside of South America.

Furthermore, the question of financing could become increasingly difficult to extricate: now that Hizbollah is a majority party in Lebanon, many people – and not only the Arabs – would see nothing wrong in financing a party that has done and does so much good "for the needy people of Lebanon". It will always be more difficult to discern which financing is legal and which is not.

This hypothesis is not advanced haphazardly. With the support of Iran, Hizbollah could start, through local groups, if it hasn't already, to set up in Latin America, the same strategy used in Lebanon to gain popular consensus, by providing for the citizens those things that a weak government has not been able to provide. There are numerous people in Latin America who describe Hizbollah as a "provider of welfare to the needy citizens and defender of the Lebanese rights against Israeli aggression".

Realizing the danger and in an attempt to stem the swelling consensus for the Party of God, the Spanish Government, in the wake of what had been done in France, closed down, at the end of June this year, the Hizbollah television channel al-Manar, which was transmitted to Latin America. The satellite TV company, Hispasat, through which Al Manar was transmitted is, in fact, controlled by the Spanish Government.

The previous government in Colombia, in an attempt to open a series of negotiations with FARC, had ceded to them the formal control of a strip of territory, permitting, in addition, foreign governments to furnish economic assistance to the area in question. Iran, the principle financier of Hizbollah was included in the list of foreign countries permitted to operate in the FARC controlled area and, therefore, it naturally supported the Hizbollah organization.

In the Summer of 2001, the Colombian magistracy determined a scenario of international terrorist link-ups, among which was not only a stable cooperation between FARC, ETA, IRA and a foreign legion of more than 200 terrorists of 18 different nationalities, but also Hizbollah.

At a summit meeting at Cartagena de Indias in Columbia, in October 2003, the news of a regular alliance between FARC and Al Qaeda was announced by Gordon Thomas, Irish expert of terrorism and the secret services.

Thomas spoke again on the theme, in the Columbian weekly, El Espectador, referring to the possible cooperation between Islamic extremist groups and local groups, and after the Madrid massacre of the 11th March, 2004, he accused Al Qaeda. According to Thomas, the ETA did not have the capacity to realize attacks of this nature, unless they had been helped, organized and financed by the Bin Laden organization.

Moreover, arms supplies continue to arrive in the Latin American continent. The US are very worried by the news of the signing, in March of this year in Caracas, of about 20 cooperation treaties between Iran and the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez regime, together with an agreement, ratified with Russia at the beginning of April, regarding the supply of 100 thousand Kalashnikov AK-47.

In addition, there is ever increasing talk about dormant cells of Islamic terrorist groups in other Latin American countries like, for example, the Venezuelan Island, Margarita, at Trinidad and Tobago.

Over the last months, in Haiti, members of an Islamic group, which appears to have ties with Al Qaeda, have provided instruction in the use of arms and explosives to a pro-Aristide gang, at the same time trying to convert the gang members to Islam.

In the Dominican Republic, two radical groups seeking technical and financial support, seem to have established contacts with Islamic radicals. Al Qaeda appears to have had ties in the country of Nicaragua for some time, and it is believed that it is now pushing groups to undertake terrorist attacks against the government.

According to what the German newspaper, "Der Spiegel" published in June of this year, in the south of Mexico, a veritable conversion to Islam activity is underway, conducted by many Moslems of "doubtful origins", who have carried out an activity of proselytism and have already recruited hundreds of Maya natives.

So when you hear about FARC rebels contacting Venezuelan Naval personnel to get them weapons, like SAMs, that is not only *not* a laughing matter but something that may only be extraordinary in the type of weapons involved. The contacts between Hugo Chavez and multiple groups in South America is fleshed out by Jose Noguera at Center for Security Policy on 23 MAR 2008, and concentrates on FARC and ELN, here picking p the trail after failed revolutionary groups in Venezuela failed to get anywhere:

The overwhelming defeat suffered by the guerrilla groups made them rethink their strategy. They decided the best way to achieve their goals was to infiltrate the armed forces. In 1970, their first contact was established between former Lieutenant William Izarra and Douglas Bravo. Then in 1971, Hugo Chavez entered the Military School and immediately established contacts with the PRV through his brother, Adam, and began organizing the clandestine Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement (MBR) to recruit other military personnel for the revolution. The failed coup that Hugo Chavez led in 1992 was organized in cooperation with the clandestine organizations MBR, PRV, Red Flag and the Socialist League.

Adam not only introduced his brother, Hugo, to Marxism but also provided him with the necessary contacts to the Venezuelan guerrillas as well as to their Colombian counterparts, with whom their Venezuelan mates had had a long-standing relationship. The first contact between Hugo Chavez and the Colombian guerrillas was made through two members of the Colombian Army, Majors German Cadena Montenegro and Mario Alberto Galeano, who collaborated with the now dissolved guerrilla group M-19 since they were in the Colombian military school. Those contacts and activities did not represent a major threat until the 1992 coup changed the political situation in Venezuela, and the difficult economic situation made Venezuelans look for unconventional alternatives that made Chavez popular.

When Hugo Chavez left prison in 1994, he visited Colombia, where Majors Cadena and Galeano, by that time already retired, received him. Chavez then stayed in Colombia for six months, adopting the nickname of Commander Centeno, while establishing contacts with the Colombian Marxist narco-guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). At this time Chavez proposed to the ELN that they organize a joint Colombian-Venezuelan guerrilla force in order to fight a "true independence war." That same year, Chavez established contacts with the other major Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC. This contact was made by Ramon Rodriguez Chacin. It is now well-documented that the FARC gave money to Chavez when he was in jail, and most likely, in 1998, during his first electoral campaign.

From Colombia, Chavez traveled to Cuba where he established contacts with Fidel Castro. Later, in 1999 when Chavez began his first presidential term, the retired Colombian Majors Cadena and Galeano join his Bolivarian Movement 2000 with the mission of winning adherents within the Colombian Armed Forces, as a means of destabilizing democracy inside Colombia. Since then, Chavez has repeatedly tried to establish direct contacts with the Colombian Armed Forces and did so again by talking directly with the chief of the Colombian Armed Forces, General Mario Montoya, against the wishes of the President of Colombia. That is why President Uribe decided to remove Chavez as a mediator in trying to free some of the hostages from the Colombian guerrillas. Once fired, Chavez became so mad that he insulted President Uribe, and stated that Venezuela does not have borders with Colombia but with the FARC's territory.

Yet, recent events indicate that the exact position of the FARC's second in command was detected from a direct phone call from Chavez to Raul Reyes, and among the documents found was one listing a 300 million dollar "donation" that Chavez gave to the Colombian guerrillas. Currently, the FARC operates freely in Venezuela in seven different areas and receives protection from the government. Chavez's closest collaborators are his brother, Adam, his minister of Interior, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, Jose Vicente Rangel (former presidential candidate of the communist party), Jorge Rodriguez (Socialist League), Minister of Energy Rafael Ramirez (PRV), Minister of Propaganda William Izarra (PRV) and the foreign Affairs Minister, Nicola s Maduro (Socialist League). Now the former Venezuelan guerrillas, the long standing close friends of their Colombian counterparts, are the individuals who now govern Venezuela.

Chavez's close ties to ELN, FARC, PRV and their radical socialist and communist sympathizers and associates in terrorism, has made Venezuela into a country being openly run by terrorists under the Chavez regime. The backing to them, including trying to destabilize other nations, like Colombia via FARC, puts Chavez on a path closer to that of Castro's sending of communist revolutionaries to foster new regimes than anything else. Even more important, however, is the backing by Hugo Chavez of Hezbollah, as seen in this CNSNEWS article by Patrick Goodenough on 07 AUG 2006:

Critics of Israel have found a new champion in Venezuela's leftist President Hugo Chavez, who in recent days has recalled his country's envoy from Israel and compared the Jewish state's military campaign in Lebanon to the actions of Nazi Germany.

After describing the Israeli operation against Hizballah as a "fascist outrage" during his recent visit to Iran, Chavez told the Arabic television network al-Jazeera in an interview broadcast on Friday that the attacks constituted "genocide."

"The Israeli offensive against the Palestinians and Lebanon is an aggression that we feel targets us also," he said. "It is an unjustified aggression that is being carried out in the style of Hitler, in a fascist fashion."

[..]

The remarks follow his decision Thursday to withdraw chief of mission Hector Quintero from Caracas' embassy in Tel Aviv, in protest.

Hizballah, which triggered the conflict with a July 12 cross-border raid in which Israeli soldiers were killed and abducted, welcomed Chavez's move.

The vice-chairman of Hizballah's political council, Mahmoud Komati, called it an example for "revolutionaries."
In an interview with Telesur -- the television network based in and funded by Venezuela, and set up by Chavez as a Latin American equivalent of al-Jazeera -- Komati lauded Chavez for a "brave decision" and noted that even Arab governments had not taken the step.

The envoy's withdrawal also has drawn strong support from other quarters.

Jordan's Islamist political party praised Chavez, while condemning the Jordanian and Egyptian governments for not severing diplomatic relations with Israel. The two Arab countries are the only ones to have concluded peace treaties and established full diplomatic ties with Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has spearheaded calls for Arab governments to cut ties with Israel and to allow citizens to travel to the warzone to fight against Israel.

Meanwhile, an Illinois-based, pro-Venezuelan Internet site VHeadlines.com, said Sunday it was being "inundated with emails from the Arab world thanking President Chavez for having the moral conviction [to have recalled the envoy]."

And in London, left-wing lawmaker George Galloway told an anti-Israeli protest rally that Chavez was a "real leader of the Arab people." (He also named other "real leaders of the Arab people," including Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah and ailing Cuban President Fidel Castro.)

Hugo Chavez, then, is not only giving verbal support to Hezbollah, but also creating a lovely television network for them in Venezuela! Chavez is also taking a further hand than that according to a Venezuela Today article by Gustavo Coronel of 02 SEP 2006 (Via Google cache, so it may not be there much longer) Chávez joins the terrorists: his path to martyrdom:

On the Venezuelan side of the Guajira Peninsula, a territory shared with Colombia, the members of the tribe of the Wayuu walk across political boundaries without restrain. They were there before Venezuela and Colombia existed and they think of themselves as a nation. Recently a disturbing group has appeared, as alien visitors, in their desert landscape: Hezbollah. The Islamic fanatics of Hezbollah are rapidly infiltrating the tribe of the Wayuu. They are indoctrinating the members of this tribe, to convert them into Islamic fanatics in charge of disseminating the terrorist message that has already created chaos, death and misery in the Middle East. The Hezbollah group invading Venezuela is doing its work openly in the Venezuelan side of the Guajira Peninsula.

And that is accompanied by this image so that folks know where this is happening:

guajira2

Gustavo Coronel then looks at the three Chavez strategies:

The three Chávez strategies

In order to do this he is conducting a three-pronged strategy: (1), one, rather orthodox, which consists in buying weapons, some US$5 billion worth, from Russia, Spain and Belarus: multi-role fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships, assault rifles and more from Russia corvettes and patrol boats from Spain; and Russian anti-aircraft missile systems from Belarus in order to dissuade U.S. military action. (2), an oil-oriented strategy, basically designed to threaten the U.S. with less petroleum supplies. He is scaling down and selling Citgo's assets in the U.S. at low prices, in order to protect himself from the freezing of oil assets in the U.S. He is trying to enlist China as a replacement client for the U.S. by promising that country, quite unrealistically, 500,000 barrels of oil per day within the next five years. The Chinese know that this is an empty promise but they will try to get as much oil as they can out of Chávez, for as long as he lasts, while laughing secretly about his flamboyant behavior. As a follow up to this strategy he is also talking to Iran about pushing for higher prices within Opec and encouraging, through promises of money, relatively minor international oil players like the dictator of Chad, the Bolivian president Evo Morales and the Ecuadorian government to become more aggressive against the mostly U.S. foreign multinationals. The visit of Chávez to Angola should be seen as an obvious move to attack U.S. vulnerability on oil imports. Angola produces over one million barrels of oil per day of excellent quality and almost 600,000 barrels per day are exported to the U.S. Any restrictions on this supply, if combined with restrictions of Venezuelan oil supplies, would have a dramatic impact on the U.S. economy, especially when reinforced by other actions such as the recent move against the U.S. petroleum companies by the dictator of Chad.

The strategies mentioned above are, of course, very damaging to the Venezuelan people but, while particularly harmful to U.S. national interest, they do not pose an immediate large-scale threat of all-out violence in the hemisphere. There is a third strategy being pursued by Chávez that could become the most dangerous in this respect. It has to do with the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction from North Korea or Iran and other weapons from Syria. Chávez and his deputies have visited Iran numerous times during the last seven years. He has explicitly formed a political alliance with Ahmadinejad. During his last visit he asked for God to "send bolts of lighting ... upon the monsters," ending this request by saying: "Inshallah," (ojalá in Spanish, God willing in English).

Of course, in Chávez's mind these bolts would be missiles or, even worse, nuclear bombs. The National Council of Resistance of Iran has said that Iran will be able to start constructing nuclear bombs by next year, in installations located to the Northeast of Tehran. A report by Rowan Scarborough in The Washington Times (August 31, 2006) says that the U.S. military estimates that an Iranian nuclear bomb is still five years away but, he adds, it would be dangerous to believe that there is plenty of time to act. In the case of Iraq, he says, it was found that the Hussein regime was much closer to producing nuclear weapons than the U.S. had estimated and the same could be true in the case of Iran. Nuclear weapons are essential for the consolidation of an Islamic empire, claims the National Council of Resistance of Iran, asking for immediate action against the regime of Ahmadinejad.

Note that the operational equipment suppliers for conventional weapons are Spain, Russia and Belarus. This work to bolster himself and expand the reach of Hezbollah is going into disturbing regions beyond the Wayuu tribe, as seen by Massimo Introvigne at Centro Studi sulle Nuove Religioni (CESNUR) on 24 MAR 2007, looking first at Teodoro Rafael Darnott (Commander Teodoro) with the Wayuu:

WIth the blessing of President Chávez, and with the methods of an old guerrlla leader, Comnader Teodoro has proclaimed Catholic missionaries "personae non gratae" over a vast tribal area (for the Protestant missionaries it's even worse: Chavez calls them agents of American imperialism), while proclaiming the Shi'ite iranian missionaries very very welcome. Estimates vary as to the result of this experiment - converts according to Teodoro and Iran come to several thousand, while anthropologists and journalists who have penetrated the area say they are fewer than a thousand - howver a whole tribe, the Wayuu, has accepted the good news from Teheran.

The press of the Venezuelan regime has started printing strange photographs of veiled Indio women, but also of hooded militants practicing with their kalashnikovs and even their bomb-belts: not in Lebanon but in Venezuela. The experiment is turning out rather well, so much so that the Iranians and Chavez have launched two more, which are already on their feet: Hezbollah Chiapas, in the areas under the control of Subcommander Marcos, and Hezbollah El Salvador. Also new are Hezbollah Chile and Hezbollah Columbia. Considering how fond our President of the House of Representatives, Fausto Bertinotti, is of Chávez and of Subcommander Marcos, all we need wait for now is for a Hezbollah Montecitorio (ie, the Italian Parliament).

The Real Danger

But these are not necessarily harmles groups. On Oct 23rd 2006 the police arrested a university student in Caracas, one José Miguel Rojas Espinosa, who was about to detonate two bombs, one against the American Embassy and another against the Israeli Embassy. After planting the first bomb, Rojas got scared and dropped the second one outside a school, which led the police to seeking the first one and foiling the attack. Hezbollah Venezuela laid claim to the failed attack and defines Rojas on its website as “the first mujaheddin to be an example of dignity and strength in the cause of Allah, the first prisoner of war in Venezuela of the Revolutionary Islamic Movement”. Strangely enough, the Chávez Administration has taken no steps against Commander Teodoro and Hezbollah Venezuela, and has played down the planned attacks calling them “demonstrations”.

Commander Teodoro is not finicky when it comes to recluting enemies of the US and Israel. So together with the Koran and with the proclamations of Khamenei, his group reprints and spreads around texts by the late Peron-style Argentinian social scientist Norberto Rafael Ceresole, a Holocaust-denier , hovering between neo- Nazi tendencies and the little sedevacante schisms which consider the latest Popes illegitimate since they are too "progressive" and "favorable to Jews". Ceresole is also always suspected of being in contact with the perpetrators of the attack on the building of the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1994 (something that, however, the police has never been able to prove).

The numbers, for the moment, are against Commander Teodoro. Not only do the deep roots of Catholicism make it difficult for Iranian propaganda to produce a number of Latin American Muslims beyond a ratio of zero point something, but so does the spectacular growth of Protestantism.

Latin America is not about to convert to Islam and Chavez's initiatives keep swaying between reality, fantasy and a propaganda that often borders on the ridiculous.

But all it takes to plant bombs are a few terrorists, and Shi'ite Indios also constitute a mafia-style warning by Chavez to the Catholic Church. If it continues to oppose the regime, in tribal zones Iranian missionaries are ready to replace the Catholic ones.

Mossimo Introvigne is pointing at something that should be obvious: the difference between terrorist groups (of any stripe) and organized crime groups is faint at the best of times. Mafia organizations have a strong ability to continue existing even when openly opposed by governments at all levels (local, state/provincial, national), and our own history, not to speak of Italy's, is proof of that. While the actual backing organizations for the late 19th century Chicago criminal organizations are gone, their descendents and imitators are still in Chicago and heavily swaying politics and city government to their own ends. Similar has been seen in Italy, Japan, Taiwan, China, India, Pakistan and even Iran which still, to this day, rails against narcotics flowing into Iran via drug traffickers not under their control.

Hugo Chavez by utilizing the Hezbollah 'brand name' and 'first cause' to radicalism is little different than Castro using Marxist/Leninist ideology or China exporting Maoist teaching to places like Peru or Nepal. While the organizations spawned from those 'first cause' associations may have little or nothing to do with their progenitors, they continue on in hybrid form by mixing how they get their funds (via criminal activity) and their ideology, no matter *what* that may be. While the direct 'first cause' Hezbollah in Lebanon has strong ideology, their South American and Southern European counterparts have strongly drifted into the criminal areas, so that the resultant groups, while still espousing and supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, have little in appearance to that originating group. Chavez, by pushing that first, strong appeal to get recruits to violence, is also creating an organized crime organization that is directly married to it. Why not? The ORIGINAL Hezbollah depends on the Kassar family control of the Bekaa opium production capabilities, overseen by the Syrian government.

This brings up a disturbing long-term possibility, although a faint one at best: that Iran (if it fails through internal collapse or external push) now has a reliable 'back-up' for running the Hezbollah operation in Hugo Chavez. Even if he is far from perfect, his ability to adapt to Shia support of the Iranian variety to push his own ends indicates that the actual teachings do get promulgated. Hezbollah would take a very hard hit, of course, as Venezuela and Hugo Chavez, do not have the resources to run the high-octane Lebanon operation as it still stands: the industrial infrastructure for things like missile production is missing in Venezuela. That said, Chavez is a direct link for acquiring the end-products from other nations (Spain, Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus) so as to ensure some long-term lethal capability remains even absent Iran. And getting his organizational operation into fronting the Bekaa drug trade is an extremely lucrative proposition for the long term, going into the billions if not tens of billions of dollars in profit annually as he would be eliminating a number of 'middlemen' in the distribution chain currently taken up by smaller mafia outfits in Albania, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and places like Algeria.

A closer equivalent to what is happening, although purely on a secular side, is Syria: where a strong family rules via authoritarian means and supports multiple terror organizations (Hezbollah, HAMAS, PKK, GIA) while seeking to get stronger industrial backing for conventional weapons and WMDs. Syria, itself, acts as a form of 'Grand Mafia Boss' over the smaller families with longer-term ties to organized crime, and utilizes that network due to the actual paucity of natural resources and production capability, to seek similar ends to protect itself. By going after the asymmetrical chem/bio/nuclear weapons, Syria need not field a modern or even very capable military to continue being a threat in the region. By facilitating terrorism and organized crime and taking a profit from that trade (either via a form of 'taxation' or kickbacks) is able to continue on while providing to the minimal needs of its population.

That design template, when shorn of its Alawite basis and Ba'athist supporters, is the rough outline for a future Venezuela under Chavez: ruled in an authoritarian fashion, where state-supported religious views are allowed and others that are attacked go uncondemned, where terrorists can come and go with relative safety to conduct business and training, while the regime utilizes a declining infrastructure and petroleum industry to allow expansion of terrorism and the narcotics trade, which it will take some funds 'off the top' for providing these services. Then things look less Marxist Revolutionary and more along the lines of 'Don Chavez', ruthless mafioso out for personal power and entrenching his organization on a regional basis. And once such a mafia starts, it will be very, very hard to uproot even once Chavez is no longer on the scene as the organization will continue on.

And as Colombia can attest to: it is very, very hard to get rid of extremists touting an ideology that act like mafia.

FARC has been like that for 40 years and is *still* around.

14 February 2008

Ending Mugniyah and missing the point

From the period of its stand-up in 1982 to the present, there has been no more effective organizer for Hezbollah than Imad Mugniyah.  From the US Embassy bombings in '83 and '84, the Marine Barracks bombing in '83 and the TWA highjacking he left an early calling card for the US in Lebanon:  get out and stay out. Additionally Hezbollah would set up shop in Kuwait via the Al-Dawa group (one of its first expansions in the 1980's), which would serve as the first group to attack outside of Lebanon and would involve Mugniyah's brother-in-law Mustafa Yousef Badreddin, although the exact nature and role Imad Mugniyah would play in that is still unclear, the close familial contact does indicate a connection of some sort between the two, beyond organizational identification.  But later events (the TWA hijacking) would demonstrate that Mugniyah had some control on this organization by 1985.

In any event, from there he would consolidate Hezbollah operations first in Lebanon, gaining a local leadership position, and then move to head up the External Security Organization of Hezbollah.  This operation was critical to expanding Hezbollah's reach beyond Lebanon into other parts of the world.  His early work with other terrorist organizations like HAMAS, IRA and PLO would set him up to be tapped into the ESO slot for two of the largest expansions of Hezbollah operations outside of the Middle East:  the Balkans and South America.  These operations ran along dual tracks in the late 1980's with the worsening position of the former Yugoslav Republics suffering their normal bouts of ethnic tensions, religious rivalries and political factioning.  Early operations there helped to expand Iranian presence and put a small foothold in Bosnia-Herzegovina that still is there to this day.  The other track I have looked at from the side of organized crime, arms shipments and narcotics traffickers and that was with the Syrian luminary of those things, Monzer al-Kassar.

This match of methodical and vicious terrorist, with methodical and ruthless transnational criminal made for a deadly and potent combination that would bring Carlos Menem into the fold for a period of time that would allow al-Kassar and Mugniyah to set up operations in South America.  al-Kassar came to that by way of his credentials, having worked with North, Hakim and Secord during the Reagan Administration and his facility with weapons procurement.  His affability and ability to deceive others on his background opened up the potential for IRBM and nuclear technology to flow from Argentina to Syria.  When the Reagan/Bush Administrations made their displeasure known, and Menem backed down, Kassar had already set himself up with control of airports and overland routes, as well as sea ports via having the inspectors answerable to his operatives.

To strike back at the US and Israel asymmetrically, he brought in Imad Mugniyah to create and carry out plans not only for the AMIA Jewish Center bombing in Argentina, but to establish a network of agents, mosques and contacts that interoperated with al-Kassar's powerbase.  Together these two would not only bring in radical Islam to South America, via immigrant populations, but would also utilize those contacts to ship South American arms illegally to the Balkans even when it was under UN embargo.  To their contacts al-Kassar added the heavy weapons and equipment dealer Bernard Lasnaud (Lasnosky) who would deal with Islamists, Communist terrorists and, generally, anyone who had serious money to spend on helicopters, artillery and aircraft.  Throughout the early 1990's those arms shipments would go into the hands of Iranian and Hezbollah operatives in the Balkans and set up terrorist training facilities in the region. 

This gave Imad Mugniyah the operations skills and contacts to further spread Hezbollah's contacts and he would follow al-Kassar's lead with the South American FARC organization.  It is during this period of the early 1990's that FARC is cited as working with and being supplied via Hezbollah, augmenting its pre-existing contacts with ETA, IRA and PLO.  The al-Kassar family, by controlling the Bekaa Valley drug trade was an integral part of Syria's ability to train agents and terrorists there from around the world (including folks like the Baader-Meinhof gang, Shining Path and Japanese Red Army, beyond standard Islamic groups like Abu Sayyaf), and Hezbollah utilized that and the FARC personnel who trained there to cement contacts with the narco-syndicate organizations of FARC and al-Kassar.  Grabbing any substantial fraction of the drug trade going through the Balkans would allow Hezbollah to gain a steady, non-Iranian based income source.  Likewise local distribution networks as wholesalers in South America for FARC would also put Hezbollah into a similar cash flow there.  al-Kassar would work to coordinate the various criminal elements including the Cali and Medellin Cartels so as to properly understand market sharing and cooperation, so that there would be integrated overlap in distribution to North America and Europe.

In the Balkans the primary organized crime families, already working with Algerian terrorist groups would likewise have their market reach expanded via Hezbollah.  In that cooperation, Imad Mugniyah would have contact with some Algerian terrorist organizations in Albania via the more well known GIA, but Hezbollah would also have its own organization there, too.  Yes, these are all through the reach of Imad Mugniyah and his now extensive operative network which, for Hezbollah, was now stretching into Europe and, with Algerian and Albanian help, into Canada and the US (particularly Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Los Angeles and North Carolina), each of which would act in coordination to deliver drugs, commit bank and credit card fraud, sell grey and black market goods from the far east, smuggling and commit tax evasion.  Thus when a Hezbollah operative is picked up driving three tons of pseudoephedrine from Canada to Mexico for processing by drug gangs in Mexico to methamphetamines, one should not be surprised to see the long arm of Hezbollah at work.

al Qaeda would look towards Hezbollah early on with contacts in the Sudan forming by an outreach between bin Laden, Zawahiri and Turabi to Hezbollah and Mugniyah.  Here the plans and commercial contacts of Mugniyah would start to work some magic, that would allow al Qaeda to understand how to create a dispersed operation for income and actual attacks, and start the flow of goods into Somalia in the late 1990's using those same contacts of Monzer al-Kassar and, now, Italian Mafia to ship drugs into Somalia in containers of toxic waste.  Even with al Qaeda having to shift its operational HQ multiple times (Sudan, Egypt, Afghanistan) the ability to deliver recruits to be trained in each of those Nations allowed al Qaeda to grow, particularly as the Taliban took control of Afghanistan.  Later al Qaeda would make the acquaintance of Viktor Bout, notorious arms dealer from Russia, either via the Syrian side of things (via the business dealings with al-Kassar) or via missed arms drop-off meant for the terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan.

Imad Mugniyah would offer the ability to train al Qaeda personnel in Sudan, the Bekaa or in FARClandia in Colombia.  That latter set of introductions would allow al Qaeda to get some  much needed contacts to also augment the ones Mugniyah had in the Balkans.  By utilizing that part of the drug trade that was more associated with Sunni Islam in Kosovo, al Qaeda recognized an opportunity to get its own foothold for training outside of Bosnia.  Mugniyah's contacts with al-Kassar would also allow al Qaeda to get in contact with the Red Mafia from Russia in the form of the Red Don, Semion Mogilevich.  Mogilevich had demonstrated ability to delivery arms, equipment, narcotics (from China and the Golden Triangle), human trafficking, explosives and the one thing that no other supplier could get to - radioactive material that had been processed.  From its early days in Egypt then in the Sudan, al Qaeda was working to make deals to get its hands on radioactive material and this was something that Pakistan was not going to provide to terrorists.  Mogilevich, having his hands in the energy industry in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, also had access to nuclear materials via those routes in the left over Soviet facilities or through his wider contacts in other criminal organizations based in Moscow.  This is one of the few places that Mugniyah would need to cede initial regional outlook to al Qaeda as Hezbollah was not immediately prepared to deal with an area called Chechnya.  Over time Iran would help Hezbollah establish its own groups there, but al Qaeda, already cooperating with Hekmatyar, had an 'easy in' with supplying fighters and arming them via Mogilevich.

That said, al Qaeda and Hezbollah were more than willing to cooperate in the US Embassy Bombings of Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole bombing and even go to the extent of sharing network contacts in the drug running business.  Further the earlier cooperation had led towards extension of both networks into Saudi Arabia (as seen in the Khobar Towers attack) and into Yemen not only for the USS Cole attack but for funding and recruitment.  al Qaeda would extend its contact network into Kenya post-bombing, to include Islamic charity front organizations and would later stage attacks on a Jewish owned hotel and attempt to use a SAM to shoot down an Israeli airliner.  Somalia, itself, continues to suffer problems from radical Islamic groups, although the Islamic Courts have been forced out with cooperation between the US, Ethiopia, Kenya and the provisional government in Somalia.  Those fleeing from this went to Eritrea and Yemen, with a few winding up in Saudi Arabia.

By the 9/11 attack, al Qaeda and Hezbollah had shared resources and even operational capability on commonly held targets, while differing with each other on some other targets (mainly al Qaeda's willingness to work with Saddam Hussein).  By the 2003 ouster of Saddam from power and the fall of Iraq, these two networks led by Mugniyah and bin Laden would share resources, again, in staging a two front insurgency into Iraq from Syria and Iran.  They both would be aided in this by the man who would be #1 on the most wanted list in Iraq for supplying the insurgency: Monzer al-Kassar.  Together these organizations brought in men, training, arms, money and expertise in not only recruitment and training, but in how to form a criminal network to support terrorism while under seige by hostile forces.  Iran would utilize Mugniyah's skills for the Kazali (and other) southern networks and Syria would use al-Kassar's skills in the north of Iraq.  These two networks interoperated along the river valleys and then across Iraq, making the very first moves to bring control to Iraq post-2003 a north-south one.  The expansion of operations, particularly the riverine work in 2005, started to address this sophisticated set-up and the 'surge' campaign of 2007 addressed it directly with a pre-surge attack on the criminal organizations.

Throughout this the MSM and even most of the on-line media have ignored the work of the multiple operations going on by the likes of Imad Mugniyah.  Part of this is the complexity of the multi-organizational cooperation and partly it is through enforced and often partisan ignorance.  These are not 'quick and easy' story lines, nor things that can be wrapped up in a single article: events along a multi-year timespan do not make good 'copy' nor compelling viewing,while simplistic events *do*.  Thus the warned about melding of organized crime and terrorism not only went unnoticed by the population at large, but by the lawmakers who have been hearing about it for over a decade.  If lawmakers are unwilling to spend the effort to get to the bottom of BCCI and its international implications on US actors and agents, then how are they to demonstrate interest in something like the Taba banking arrangement or even more informal hawala payment systems that allow terrorism to flourish on the small scale?  These things were not unknown in the realm of law enforcement or treasury areas, and yet they went unaddressed even *after* having Interpol demonstrate the problems this was causing on a global scale and the impacts it was having on the US *before* 9/11.

While the ending of Imad Mugniyah is some cause for celebration, the actual hard work of pulling up the systems that he put in place has not only not begun in the US, but it has only started in the one area vital to the armed forces where it is present:  Iraq.  The borders of Iraq de-limit the scope and breadth of attacking these criminal networks that enhance and support organized crime far beyond the Middle East, and stretching all the way to small time crime in Ontario, Quebec, California, Washington State and North Carolina.  To date no one has found how complete cars are stolen, trans-shipped to the Middle East to show up in al Qaeda bomb shops in Iraq.  If we can't get law enforcement and our export system interested on the large scale like the Bank of New York scandal, then getting it interested in such a simple thing like stolen cars aimed at killing our servicemen seems far-fetched.  Without a foreign policy set up to approach these things across the scale, the ending of an Imad Mugniyah, and the pick-up of al-Kassar last year and the Red Don this year has ignored that their networks which they organized to work *without them* continue unabated.  For Mogilevich the Dmitry Firtash network of semi-legitimate businesses still serves as a facade to the larger system that got Firtash into business and the investments of Mogilevich to establish a large scale money laundering enterprise based on the energy business.  Likewise the bureaucratic system set up by Mugniyah to run charities and criminal operations were made to work in the eventuality of his sudden demise or capture, the latter of which would at least offer a chance to start unraveling them.  And for al-Kassar, his family has a long and established line in Syria and his associates and family members are well versed in picking up those loose-ends he left behind and in pressuring Syria to get him *back*.

In all the adulation of the end of Mugniyah, we miss the larger and nastier point that he was one of many capable individuals who have set up organizations with forethought: they can be taken out, but the systems they made will continue onwards.  It is very handy to take out such a skilled individual in a permanent fashion, as the likes of al-Kassar and Mogilevich are so skilled that they have yet to pay for their crimes because of their ability to use the law's loopholes to ensure they are not easily fingered with *anything*.  Considering that something a bit less difficult, like the Gambino Family in the US has been around and will continue to be around even after the recent spate of arrests, how does one address a system like Hezbollah that has the support of Iran and Syria or the al-Kassar family that stretches its syndicate across four continents?  And as Russia has moved into a 1/3 sharing arrangement for its industry between State, Private and Criminal investment, with the criminal part doing its hardest to *also* be in the private sector, what, exactly, is the long term solution to those crime groups that support terrorism from China to the US?

I am very, very glad that Imad Mugniyah finally met his end.

I am not convinced, however, that we actually understand the deep and complex threat that he was a part of that will continue to expand until it is addressed across all fronts of military, economic, law enforcement and foreign policy, with a strong and hefty back-up on law enforcement and border policing, coupled with shipment inspection at home.  Until we take them as seriously as the other organizations that have done this in the past, not only will the threat not be stopped, but it will continue its advances until civil society becomes threatened on a global scale.  If it has taken decades to see the equivalent of one skilled crime boss go down, what does this tell us about our ability to address the multiple 'families' of terrorism that all work together to delineate territory, share resources and kill wantonly without fear of reprisal?

Removing Imad Mugniyah is a very good thing.

It is, unfortunately, not even starting to get at the problem itself.

As a society and a Nation if we cannot get away from the 'sound-bite' culture driving our view of the world, then this will slowly erode us until it will be too late to address it.  It is *already* here.  And I have yet to hear any substantial proposals on how to roll it back and address it from either the Left or the Right.  The Left wishes to give up to it and society with it, by wishing there just weren't such nasty people in the world.  The Right is just looking for a lovely economy and doesn't want to put that at risk doing the things necessary to defend it.

Neither one of these is realistic nor sustainable in even the short term.  Both are lethal in the long term because neither address the threat nor deal with it.

Too bad our Presidential candidates won't address these things.

We may not get the leadership we need, but we will get the one we *deserve* at this rate.

19 January 2008

The new fronts in the Global War on Terrorism - Part II

The following post is made with Windows Live Writer, which may or may not be a help but it looks to be worth a try. (The x64 installs are here via the .msi files, which are necessary for folks using WinXP Pro x64 as the Mothership's Live Team has been remiss in actually working with their own supported operating systems). As Jerry Pournelle says: "I do these things so you won't have to."

This is picking up after the hasty post of Part I, as I was unsure of the availability of my offline material. To pick up that thread of looking at the other and new fronts on the GWOT, I examined the Philippines, Somalia, and gave short shrift to Kosovo as I had recently posted on that.

The Balkans - Albania

I will expand a bit on The Balkans, however, from that previous post on Kosovo as it demonstrates a prime mover of the Islamic form of terrorism outside of religion and oil money. That mover is the transport of illegal drugs that have mostly been done by organized crime, but is now being aided and abetted by (and often taken over by) terrorist organizations. Most people discount this trade as a funding source, but the scope of it is not addressed, so that a proper examination of its impact can be measured. For this I will utilize the testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo, Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Program, Director, Counterterrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic & International Studies given before Congress on 13 DEC 2000. In his testimony he offers a brief snapshot of the world affairs of terrorism circa 2000 concentrating on terrorism and 'narco-states', and things have not changed much since then, even with the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. He gives us this look at the Balkans:

During the NATO campaign against the former Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999, the Allies looked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to assist in efforts to eject the Serbian army from Kosovo. What was largely hidden from public view was the fact that the KLA raise part of their funds from the sale of narcotics. Albania and Kosovo lie at the heart of the "Balkan Route" that links the "Golden Crescent" of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the drug markets of Europe. This route is worth an estimated $400 billion a year and handles 80 percent of heroin destined for Europe.
That is quite a bit of funds to pass through the region and the other man to give testimony that day would add into that with a more particular view. That was Ralf Mutschke, Interpol's Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime on 13 DEC 2000, and the excerpt is lengthy due to the nature of the complexity involved:
Albanian Organized Crime Groups.

Albanian organized crime groups are hybrid organizations, often involved both in criminal activity of an organized nature and in political activities, mainly relating to Kosovo. There is certain evidence that the political and criminal activities are deeply intertwined. Also, it has become increasingly clear that Albanian crime groups have engaged in significant cooperation with other transnational crime groups.

Several extraneous factors explain the current, relatively strong, position of Albanian organized crime:

1. Concerning Albanian organized crime in the United States, the 1986 break-up of the "Pizza connection" made it possible for other ethnic crime groups to "occupy" the terrain which had until then been dominated by the Italians. For Albanians this was especially easy since they had already been working with, or mainly for, Italian organized crime.

2. Due to a highly developed ethnic conscience - fortified by a Serb anti- Albanian politics in the 80’s and 90’s, Albanians, particularly Kosovars, have developed a sense of collective identity necessary to engage in organized crime. It is this element, based on the affiliation to a certain group, which links organized Albanian crime to Panalbanian ideals, politics, military activities and terrorism. Albanian drug lords established elsewhere in Europe began contributing funds to the "national cause" in the 80’s. From 1993 on, these funds were to a large extent invested in arms and military equipment for the KLA (UÇK) which made its first appearance in 1993.

3. From 1990 on, the process of democratization in Albania has resulted in a loss of state control in a country that had been totally dominated by the communist party and a system of repression. Many Albanians lacked respect for the law since, to them, they represented the tools of repression during the old regime. Loss of state structures resulted in the birth of criminal activities, which further contributed to the loss of state structures and control.

4. Alternative routing for about 60% of European heroin became necessary in 1991 with the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia and the blocking of the traditional Balkan route. Heroin was thus to a large extent smuggled through Albania, over the Adriatic into Italy and from there on to Northern and Western Europe. The war also enabled organized criminal elements to start dealing arms on a large scale.

5. Another factor which contributed to the development of criminal activities, is the embargos imposed on Yugoslavia by the international community and on the F.Y.RO.M. by Greece (1993-1994) in the early 90’s. Very quickly, an illegal triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics developed in the region with Albania being the only state not hit by international sanctions.

6. In 1997, the so-called pyramid savings schemes in the Albanian republic collapsed. This caused nation-wide unrest between January and March 1997, during which incredible amounts of military equipment disappeared (and partly reappeared during the Kosovo conflict): 38,000 hand-guns, 226,000 Kalashnikovs, 25,000 machine-guns, 2,400 anti-tank rocket launchers, 3,500,000 hand grenades, 3,600 tons of explosives. Even though organized crime groups were probably unable to "control" the situation, it seems clear that they did profit from the chaos by acquiring a great number of weapons. Albanian organized crime also profited from the financial pyramids which they seem to have used to launder money on a large scale. Before the crash, an estimated 500 to 800 million USD seem to have been transferred to accounts of Italian criminal organizations and Albanian partners. This money was then reinvested in Western countries.

7. The Kosovo conflict and the refugee problem in Albania resulted in a remarkable influx of financial aid. Albanian organized crime with links to Albanian state authorities seems to have highly profited from these funds. The financial volume of this aid was an estimated $163 million. The financial assets of Albanian organized crime were definitely augmented due to this situation.

8. When considering the presence of Albanians in Europe, one has to keep in mind the massive emigration of Albanians to Western European countries in the 90’s. In 2000, estimations concerning the Albanian diaspora are as follows:
United States and Canada: 500,000
Greece: 500,000
Germany: 400,000
Switzerland: 200,000
Turkey: 65,000
Sweden: 40,000
Great Britain: 30,000
Belgium: 25,000
France: 20,000
For those emigrants to EU countries or Switzerland, the temptation to engage in criminal activities is very high as most of them are young Albanian males, in their twenties and thirties, who are unskilled workers and who have difficulties finding a job. For Italian organized crime, these Albanians were ideal couriers in the drug trafficking business running through Albania as they were able to circumvent the area border patrols after the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia. Many of them came into contact with Albanian organized crime through Albanian émigré communities located throughout Western Europe. This gave an impetus to the dispersion and internationalization of Albanian criminal groups.

The typical structure of the Albanian Mafia is hierarchical. Concerning "loyalty", "honor" and clan traditions, (blood relations and marriage being very important) most of the Albanian networks seem to be "old-fashioned" and comparable to the Italian Mafia networks of thirty or forty years ago. Infiltration into these groups is thus very difficult. Heroin networks are usually made up of groups of fewer than 100 members, constituting an extended family residing all along the Balkan route from Eastern Turkey to Western Europe. The Northern Albanian Mafia which runs the drug wholesale business is also known by the name of "The Fifteen Families."

Regarding cooperation with other transnational criminal groups, the Albanian Mafia seems to have established good working relationships with the Italian Mafia. On the 27th of July 1999 police in Durrës (Albania), with Italian assistance arrested one of the godfathers of the "Sacra Corona Unita", Puglia’s Italian Mafia. This Albanian link seems to confirm that the Sacra Corona Unita have "officially" accepted Albanian organized crime as a "partner" in Puglia/Italy and delegated several criminal activities. This might be due to the fact that the Sacra Corona Unita is a rather recent phenomenon, not being as stable nor as strong as other Mafias in Italy. Their leaders might have decided to join forces rather than run the risk of a conflict with Albanian groups known to be extremely violent. Thus in certain areas of Italy, the market for cannabis, prostitution and smuggling of illegal immigrants is run mainly by Albanians. Links to Calabria’s Mafia, the "Ndrangheta", exist in Northern Italy. Several key figures of the Albanian Mafia seem to reside frequently in the Calabrian towns of Africo, Plati and Bovalino (Italy), fiefs of the Ndrangheta. Southern Albanian groups also seem to have good relationships with Sicily’s "Cosa Nostra", which seems to be moving steadily into finance and money laundering, leaving other typical illegal activities to other groups. Close relationships also exist with other criminal groups active along the Balkan route, where Turkish wholesalers, Bulgarian and Romanian traffickers are frequent business partners. There are also indications that a South American cartel has become active in Albania through Albanian middlemen, in order to place more cocaine on the European market.

The heavy involvement of Albanian criminal groups in drugs trafficking, mainly heroin is proven. Currently, more than 80% of the heroin on the European market has been smuggled through the Balkans, having mainly been produced in Afghanistan and traveled through Iran and Turkey or Central Asia. In the Balkan region, two routes seem to have replaced the former traditional route, disrupted by the Yugoslavian conflict: one Northern route running mainly through Bulgaria, then Romania and Hungary and one Southern route running from Bulgaria through F.Y.R.O.M., the Kosovo region and Albania. An average of more than a ton of heroin and more than 10 tons of hashish are seized along those Balkan routes each year. According to DEA estimations, between 4 and 6 tons of heroin leave Turkey each month bound for Western Europe, traveling along the Balkan routes.

Albanian trafficking networks are becoming more and more powerful, partly replacing Turkish networks. This is especially the case in several German speaking countries, Sweden and Norway. According to some estimations, Albanian networks control about 70% of the heroin market today in Switzerland, Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries. According to analyses of the Swedish and Norwegian police, 80% of the heroin smuggled into the countries can be linked to Albanian networks. In 1998, Swiss police even estimated that 90% of the narco-business in the country was dominated by Albanians. Throughout Europe, around 40% of the heroin trade seems to be controlled by Albanians. Recent refugees from the Kosovo region are involved in street sales. Tensions between the established ethnic Albanians and newcomers seem to exist, heroin prices having dropped due to their arrival and due to growing competition in the market.

Albanian networks are not only linked to heroin. In the Macedonian border region, production laboratories for amphetamine and methamphetamine drugs seem to have been set up. Currently, these pills are destined for the local market. Cannabis is grown in Albania and cultivation seems to have become more and more popular, especially in the South. Annual Albanian marijuana revenue is estimated at $40 million. In 1999, cannabis plantations existed in the regions of Kalarat (about 80 kilometers from Vlorë/Albania) and close to Girokastër in the regions of Sarandë, Delvina and Permetti. Albanian cannabis is mainly sold on the Greek market. In order to transport the drugs to Greece, Albanian crime groups work together with Greek criminals.

Albanian criminals are also involved in the traffic of illegal immigrants to Western European countries. It is part of international trafficking networks, which not only transport Albanians, but also Kurds, Chinese and people from the Indian subcontinent. The Albanian groups are mainly responsible for the crossing of the Adriatic Sea from the Albanian coast to Italy. Departures mainly take place from Vlorë, some of them from Durrës or even from Ulcinj in the South of Montenegro. By the end of 1999, the crossing costs about $1,000 USD for an adult and $500 USD for a child. It is interesting to notice that some illegal immigrants had to pay for their journey only once in their home country (e.g. $6,000 in Pakistan), but that the nationality of the trafficking groups changed as they moved along. This implies that Albanian groups are only a part of international distribution networks. In 1999, approximately 10,000 people were smuggled into EU countries via Albania every month. The Italian border patrol intercepted 13,118 illegal immigrants close to the Puglian coast from January until July 1999. It estimated arrivals only in this coastal region at 56,000 in 1999. For the Albanian crime groups, illegal immigration - even though it can not be compared to the narco-business - is an important source of income, bringing in an estimated fifty million USD in 1999.
Immigration is not only a source of income, it is also very important in order to create networks in foreign countries and thus create bridgeheads for the Albanian Mafia abroad. Reports indicate that of the people admitted into Western European or North America as refugees during the Kosovo conflict, at least several had been carefully chosen by the Albanian Mafia to stay in the host country and act as a future liaison for the criminal networks.

Trafficking in women and forced prostitution seem to have become much more important for Albanian organized crime in 1999, with thousands of women from Kosovo having fled to Albania during the armed conflict in the region. About 300,000 women from Eastern European countries work as prostitutes in Europe. More and more seem to be "organized" in Albanian networks that are not only limited to ethnic Albanian prostitutes, but also comprise women from Romania, Bosnia, Moldova, Russia, etc. The pimps often pretend to be Kosovars in order to have the status of a political refugee, even though many of them come from Albania. Some seem to control the "business" from abroad. Belgium, in particular, seems to be the seat of several leaders of the trafficking networks. In 1999, ten people linked to Albanian crime were shot in Brussels.

Finally, Albanian criminal groups frequently engage in burglaries, armed robberies and car theft in Europe and the United States.

There might still be links between political/military Kosovar Albanian groups (especially the KLA) and Albanian organized crime. Of the almost 900 million DM which reached Kosovo between 1996 and 1999, half was thought to be illegal drug money. Legitimate fundraising activities for the Kosovo and the KLA could have been be used to launder drug money. In 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization, indicating that it was financing its operations with money from the international heroin trade and loans from Islamic countries and individuals, among them allegedly Usama bin Laden. Another link to bin Laden is the fact that the brother of a leader in an Egyptian Djihad organization and also a military commander of Usama bin Laden, was leading an elite KLA unit during the Kosovo conflict. In 1998, the KLA was described as a key player in the drugs for arms business in 1998, "helping to transport 2 billion USD worth of drugs annually into Western Europe". The KLA and other Albanian groups seem to utilize a sophisticated network of accounts and companies to process funds. In 1998, Germany froze two bank accounts belonging to the "United Kosova" organization after it had been discovered that several hundred thousand dollars had been deposited into those accounts by a convicted Kosovar Albanian drug trafficker.

The possibility of an Albanian/Kosovar drugs for arms connection is confirmed by at least two affairs in 1999:

-an Italian court in Brindisi (Italy) convicted an Albanian heroin trafficker who admitted obtaining weapons for the KLA from the Mafia in exchange for drugs.

-An Albanian individual placed orders in the Czech Republic for light infantry weapons and rocket systems. According to Czech police sources, the arms were bound for the KLA.

-Each KLA commander seems to have had funds at his disposal in order to be able to pay directly for weapons and ammunition for his local units’ need.

It is difficult to predict the further development of Albanian organized crime. Being a recent phenomenon, its stability is difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, future threats are realistic given the ruthlessness and lack of scruples displayed by Albanian crime groups, the international links which already exist, the professionalism which characterizes most of their activities and the strong ties created by ethnic Albanian origins. Moreover, the strong position of Albanian crime groups in Kosovo, F.Y.R.O.M. and the Albanian republic itself, is definitely a cause of concern to the international community, especially when one takes into account the geo-political instability in the region and the presence of a UN peacekeeping force.
The Albanian organized crime families, "The 15 Families" are not only tightly bound by ethnicity and family, but are an inherent trust network that stretches across the SE European Nations and serve as a conduit for drugs, illegal immigration, weapons and money laundering. Their contacts sweep through all the way to Russia and outwards to South America, Africa and even North America. As he had previously cited the connections between Algeria and Albania, a prime figure in transnational terrorism also showed up. Again, from Mr. Mutschke:
The events in Canada and the United States should be seen in a wider perspective. Indeed, intelligence shows that several Algerian terrorist leaders were present at a meeting in Albania, which could also have been attended by Usama bin Laden , who was believed to be in Albania at that time. It was during this meeting that many structures and networks were established for propaganda and fund raising activities, and for providing Algerian armed groups with logistical support. The arrest at the Canada-US border in December 1999 may indicate that the Algerian terrorists are prepared to take their terrorism campaign to North America.
This links the Afghanistan drug networks, al Qaeda and the European drug system together and provides a source of income for those operating that system. His presence there was known as seen in Expert Magazine, 30 AUG 1999, via Globalsecurity document cache:
In 1994 Saudi Arabia deprived bin Laden of his citizenship, compelling him to leave for Sudan together with his "Afghan veterans." In a bid to do the United States a favour, the government of Sudan ejected him in 1996. Bin Laden then returned to Afghanistan, dreaming to copy the Afghan model all over the Moslem world, first and foremost in the post-Soviet republics. A ramified war-veteran organisation, as well as prosperous enterprises, which provide jobs and money to such people, and which also effectively conceal their real-life activities, still operates in Sudan, constituting bin Laden's rearguard. Those undercover "veterans" have committed bloody outrages in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Israel, Germany, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

However, bin Laden's phone conversations on Afghan territory have been intercepted increasingly frequently over the last few months. Accordingly, bin Laden has begun to use couriers for communicating with his "veterans." Indeed, such couriers have handed over coded PC floppy disks in the course of some macabre death-relay race. But this practice has entailed less efficient management. Apart from that, bin Laden has become convinced that, given the current globalisation of NATO's police functions (he was particularly impressed with the war in Yugoslavia - Ed.), terrorist cells are unable to achieve any impressive successes in the Middle East, which is regarded as a strategic region by the West. In this situation, the seething Caucasus has become a rather attractive area for El Qaidah's militants.
You did know that Osama bin Laden used Kosovo and Albania as a centralized meeting point and a good area to set up training camps, right? Not just training camps, either, as the lucrative drug trade offers a funding source that is possibly third (behind oil funds from wealthy citizens or States) and donations for transnational terrorist groups. While getting 1% of the overall Balkans drug trade under the auspices of, say, al Qaeda, may seem meager that is a $4 billion/year proposition in transactional money. Add in a 'terrorist tax' of 10% and that is $400 million/year of ongoing and, indeed, increasing income as the use of narcotics increases annually.

This brings us to the next area of interest:

The Balkans - Bosnia

The influence of another State actor in Bosnia was first looked into during the 1990's as the UN arms embargo was not stopping the flow of arms into the region, which I covered in this post on Bosnia, previously. Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN) asked the State Dept. for its views and got them in a letter from Barbara Larkin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs dated 20 MAY 1996, which he had put into the Congressional Record: June 11, 1996 (Extensions), DOCID:cr11jn96-22, THIRD-COUNTRY ARMS DELIVERIES TO BOSNIA AND CROATIA, which gives that actor and the problems it would bring:
How did the Administration assess the implications of such a policy change on international adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 713 and U.S. efforts to get friends and allies to stop trade, economic dealings, and investment ties with Iran? Iran's entry into the Bosnian conflict occurred long before the April 1994 decision. Iranian efforts to gain influence in Bosnia date back to the 1980s. They gained momentum in 1991-92, in the early stages of the war, when the international community proved unable to confront Serb aggression. During this period, despite the UN arms embargo, Iran established itself as Bosnia's principal arms supplier and dispatched hundreds of Revolutionary Guard and other personnel to assist in training Bosnian Government forces. Iranian military aid was part of a multi-pronged campaign of support that also included intelligence cooperation along with economic and humanitarian assistance. We have no evidence that Iran's presence in Bosnia increased significantly after April 1994. It is also worth noting that, through the Dayton Accords and subsequent diplomacy, we have reduced Iranian military influence in Bosnia to its lowest levels in years. The April 1994 decision had no discernable impact on U.S. efforts to gain international support for the use of economic pressure to alter Iran's objectionable behavior, including its support for terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 1994, our Allies had generally been unresponsive to our requests that they not provide Iran with economic benefits such as new official credits and loan guarantees. In the past year, however, following the President's decision to impose a trade and investment embargo against Iran, most European countries have substantially reduced the pace and volume of economic activity with Iran. We continue to urge European governments to join our efforts to pressure Iran economically. Based on our ongoing consultations, including the April 19 meeting in Rome of the U.S.-EU-Canada Working Group on Iran, we have concluded that the April 1994 decision has not significantly affected our Iran diplomacy.
This view would prove to be overoptimistic and based on faulty Intel, however. From the Joint Committee on Special Operations at Globalsecurity.org on Iranian Intelligence Operations updated 2005:
Iranian intelligence agencies are also mounting extensive operations in Bosnia to gather information and counter Western influence. As of late 1997 more than 200 Iranian agents have insinuated themselves into Bosnian Muslim political and social circles, and infiltrated the US program to train the Bosnian army. Iranian is collaborating with a pro-Iranian faction in Bosnia's intelligence service, the Agency for Investigation and Documentation. But Iran's intelligence operations extend far beyond the training program, and are aimed at influencing a broad range of Bosnian institutions.
Thus, not only was Iran *not* reducing its numbers in Bosnia, it was actually infiltrating *more* people into Bosnia than before, so the Clinton Administration not only didn't know the base of the trendline, but did not know its direction either, which was UP not DOWN.

And just what were they doing? Well, the fine folks at Globalsecurity.org also provide this bit from their Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty library, which is part of a series aired in 2005 about Iran's extensive backing of terrorism abroad:
Outside of the Middle East, Iran also appears to have sought to use its aid to Bosnia's Muslims during the conflict there to secretly train fundamentalist groups.Analyst Nima Rashedan said much of the evidence of such activities comes from documents seized by NATO forces in Bosnia."This is a case that happened in a place in Bosnia. Before the Dayton Accords and the presence of the United States and NATO in Bosnia, the Islamic Republic had sent groups to Bosnia, including the Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force, led by Mohammad Reza Shams Naqdi, and his deputy, Hossein Allahkaram, based near Sarajevo -- another group from the Intelligence Ministry -- who had set up a camp, training fundamentalists close to [Alija] Izetbegovic's Democratic Action Party, to establish the intelligence apparatus of Bosnia. Later, NATO attacked the camp and arrested a number of people, including Iranian intelligence officials. The most interesting point was the discovery of documents that were part of the curriculum for the training of Bosnian intelligence recruits by Iranians. Among the instructions in the texts were methods for killing opposition figures and silencing journalists. That is, the Intelligence Ministry instructed a foreign organization's members how to intimidate, hunt, kidnap, eliminate, and threaten the families and the financial sources of journalists," Rashedan said.
Yes, journalists do pay attention to their trade, but note that opposition leaders can and did (and do) get the exact, same treatment.

The reason for that change in quantity of Intel operatives is not only the ability to insinuate agents from Hezbollah and the Qods Force there, but the lucrative drug trade going through the Balkans. The same logic that works for al Qaeda a few years later also works for Hezbollah then. In fact the entire region, even *with* UN troops in Kosovo and Bosnia, would not stop terrorists from congregating there.

This short article from Pravda on 09 OCT 2002 has this on goings-on in Bosnia:
Islamic Fundamentalists from al-Qaida, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad Meet in Bosnia. An illegal meeting of Islamic fundamentalists from over 50 countries took place yesterday in the Bosnian town of Travnik, which is under the control of the Muslim-Croatian Federation. According to the law-enforcement authorities of Bosnia's Serbian Republic, the meeting included representatives of Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood and Active Islamic Youth.According to representatives of the special forces of the Serbian Republic, al-Qaida radicals were in Travnik for two days, but neither the Bosnian police nor SFOR peacekeeping soldiers made any attempt to arrest them. In Travnik Islamic delegates reached an agreement on the 'full consolidation' of religious and political movements in the battle against 'American aggression'. According to Rosbalt's correspondent, over twenty Islamic radicals illegally entered Bosnia from Albania.
Quite the confab! Muslim Brotherhood (Islamic Jihad), Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad (most likely that of Imad Mugniyah's Hezbollah External Security Organization), and al Qaeda. And do note that they all entered from: Albania. This begins to tie the Balkans region together via these organizations from organized crime to Islamic terrorist groups. On 16 JAN 1997 the Republican Policy Committee in the US Senate would put out an editorial examining how the Clinton Administration allowed radical Islamic terrorism to move into the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. This from The Militant Islamic Network section:
The House Subcommittee report also concluded (page 2): "The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US strategic interests." Further -- " . . . The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure from top to bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia. The Iranian intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist support systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus [known as the Agency for Information and Documentation (AID)] to act as their intelligence and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly planning terrorist activities. The Iranian embassy became the largest in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled privileges and access at every level of the Bosnian government." (page 201)

Not Just the Iranians

To understand how the Clinton green light would lead to this degree of Iranian influence, it is necessary to remember that the policy was adopted in the context of extensive and growing radical Islamic activity in Bosnia. That is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants had long been active in Bosnia; the American green light was an important political signal to both Sarajevo and the militants that the United States was unable or unwilling to present an obstacle to those activities -- and, to a certain extent, was willing to cooperate with them. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of facilitating the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the de facto partner of an ongoing international network of governments and organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of Islamic revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran), and Turkey, together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian and cultural activities. For example, one such group about which details have come to light is the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney humanitarian organization which has been a major link in the arms pipeline to Bosnia. ["How Bosnia's Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo: Relief Agency Brokered Aid From Nations, Radical Groups," Washington Post, 9/22/96; see also "Saudis Funded Weapons For Bosnia, Official Says: $300 Million Program Had U.S. 'Stealth Cooperation'," Washington Post, 2/2/96] TWRA is believed to be connected with such fixtures of the Islamic terror network as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (the convicted mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Osama Binladen, a wealthy Saudi emigre believed to bankroll numerous militant groups. [WP, 9/22/96] (Sheik Rahman, a native of Egypt, is currently in prison in the United States; letter bombs addressed to targets in Washington and London, apparently from Alexandria, Egypt, are believed connected with his case. Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan, until last year; he is now believed to be in Afghanistan, "where he has issued statements calling for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf." [WP, 9/22/96])
These were and are relatively well known organizations and figures operating in that region for the express purpose of not only shifting to a new base of operations but to ensure that it had indigenous funding. This would be done through the radicalization of local politics, namely the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in the Bosnian government. Such figures as Alija Izetbegovic, Hasan Cengic, and Dzemal Merdan are cited in the report as being supporters of radical Islamic concepts for governing and the overthrow of non-Muslim governments. For that window of time, starting in the early 1990's and going on for nearly a decade, the leaders in Bosnia had ties to radical Islamic groups and sought the aid and arming by them. A Cybercast News Service report by Sherrie Gossett on 17 AUG 2005 would look at the problems of Bosnia and the groups it attracts:
Terrorists who previously targeted the U.S. are now in Bosnia, where they have access to a "one-stop shop" of jihad training camps, weapons and illegal Islamic "charities" -- all at the doorstep of Europe, terrorism experts said. "[Convicted terrorist] Karim Said Atmani recently returned to Bosnia after being released early from French prison for 'good behavior,'" terrorism expert and author Evan Kohlmann said.Atmani, a Moroccan, was linked to the "millennium bomb plot" and convicted by a French court of colluding with Osama bin Laden. He has been linked to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an organization responsible for airplane hijackings and subway bombings in France.

[..]

Also finding haven in Bosnia is Abu el Maali, who like Atmani, was a foreign national who fought in the Bosnia war. El Maali was later accused by French authorities of attempting to smuggle explosives in 1998 to an Egyptian terrorist group plotting to destroy U.S. military installations in Germany. He was also accused of leading terrorist cells in Bosnia, Pakistan and Afghanistan."This activity is very significant," said Kohlmann. "Senior members of the former Muslim Brigade and their top commanders are still there, and they're still active."

The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF), a charity that was later found by the U.S. Treasury to be underwriting terrorist operations including al Qaeda, shut its offices in Bosnia after the U.S. announcement but reopened under the name "Vazir." The new organization was registered as an "association for sport, culture and education."In 2002, the U.S. Treasury Department reported that the Bosnia office of Al-Haramain was linked to Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, an Egyptian terrorist group that was a signatory to bin Laden's Feb. 23, 1998, fatwa -- or religious edict -- against the United States.

[..]

Christopher Brown, research associate with the Transitions to Democracy Project at the Hudson Institute, echoed the report. "A lot of these camps are very mobile," he said. "Bosnia has a lot of rugged territory where such camps can be set up temporarily."

The idea that there are no jihadist camps in Bosnia and radical Islam has not gained any foothold there, as some analysts suggest, is "ridiculous," according to Brown. He points to the raising of two Waffen-SS divisions under the encouragement of the mufti of Jerusalem during World War II, up to the spread of Wahhabism by the Saudis beginning in the 1960s and 1970s."Al Qaeda cells were set up in Bosnia in the early 1990s by Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's right-hand man, and bin Laden was said to visit the area twice in the mid-1990s," Brown added. "Iran was very involved in supporting the Islamist separatist movement in Bosnia, and Hezbollah was doing training there in the 1990s."Training also takes place inside youth centers and school gyms, according to Trifunovic.

[..]

"Only a very small minority of Bosnians are attracted to this," said Kohlmann. "This is primarily a foreign phenomenon -- mostly consisting of Syrians, Egyptians and Algerians."
Although later in the article views that the attempt to graft jihad onto politics has been seen as a failure in Bosnia, the ability to train small cadres of men, particularly young men, on a mobile base concept is one that cannot be discounted.

The connection between terrorism and narcotics is examined by Ioannis Michaletos on his Serbianna blog, giving a reprint from a 2001 article by Marcia Christoff Kurop in the WSJ:
The overnight rise of heroin trafficking through Kosovo — now the most important Balkan route between Southeast Asia and Europe after Turkey — helped also to fund terrorist activity directly associated with al Qaeda and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Opium poppies, which barely existed in the Balkans before 1995, have become the No. 1 drug cultivated in the Balkans after marijuana. Operatives of two al Qaeda-sponsored Islamist cells who were arrested in Bosnia on Oct. 23 were linked to the heroin trade, underscoring the narco-jihad culture of today’s post-war Balkans.

These drug rings in turn form part of an estimated $8 billion a year Taliban annual income from global drug trafficking, predominantly in heroin. According to Mr. Bodansky, the terrorism expert, bin Laden administers much of that trade through Russian mafia groups for a commission of 10% to 15% — or around $1 billion annually.

The settling of Afghan-trained mujahideen in the Balkans began around 1992, when recruits were brought into Bosnia by the ruling Islamic party of Bosnia, the Party of Democratic Action, from Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, as well as Italy, Germany and Turkey. They were all given journalists’ credentials to avoid explicit detection by the West. Others were married immediately to Bosnian Muslim women and incorporated into regular army ranks.

Intelligence services of the Nordic-Polish SFOR (previously IFOR) sector alerted the U.S. of their presence in 1992 while the number of mujahideen operating in Bosnia alone continued to grow from a few hundred to around 6,000 in 1995. Though the Clinton administration had been briefed extensively by the State Department in 1993 on the growing Islamist threat in former Yugoslavia, little was done to follow through.

The Bosnian Embassy in Vienna issued a passport to bin Laden in 1993, according to various reports in the Yugoslav press at the time. The reports add that bin Laden then visited a terrorist camp in Zenica, Bosnia in 1994. The Bosnian government denies all of this, but admits that some passport records have been lost. Around that time, bin Laden directed al Qaeda “senior commanders” to incorporate the Balkans into an complete southeastern approach to Europe, an area stretching from the Caucasus to Italy. Al Zawahiri, the Egyptian surgeon reputed to be the second in command of the entire al Qaeda network, headed up this southeastern frontline.

By 1994, major Balkan terrorist training camps included Zenica, and Malisevo and Mitrovica in Kosovo. Elaborate command-and-control centers were further established in Croatia, and Tetovo, Macedonia as well as around Sofia, Bulgaria, according to the U.S. Congress’s task force on terrorism. In Albania, the main training camp included even the property of former Albanian premier Sali Berisha in Tropje, Albania, who was then very close to the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Not even stalwart NATO ally Turkey escaped the network. Areas beyond government control were also visited by bin Laden in 1996 according to London-based Jane’s Intelligence Review. The government has been battling two terrorist groups: Jund al Islam, whose assassinated Syrian leader was one of bin Laden’s closets confidantes, and the Kurdish PKK, whose leader, Abdullah Ocalan, merged his group’s activities with those of Iran’s Hezbollah in 1998.

Furthermore, as revealed in the February 2001 East Africa bombing trial testimony of Jamal al Fadl — an al Qaeda operative in charge of weapons development in Sudan — uranium used in “dirty bombs” that release lethal radioactive material, had been tested in 1994 by members of the Sudan-based Islamic National Front in the town of Hilat Koko, in Turkish-held northern Cyprus. Cyprus, both its north and southern sides, has also become a center for offshore money laundering by Arab banks fronting al Qaeda funds into the Balkans. The CIA puts al Qaeda’s specific Balkan-directed funds — those tied to the “humanitarian” agencies and local banks and not explicitly counting the significant drug profits added to that — at around $500 million to $700 million between 1992 and 1998.

So where was the U.S. in all this? It was not until 1995 that the Clinton administration was forced to start pursuing the Islamist network in the Balkans. Not quite a month after the Dayton accords had been signed in November 1995, an influx of Iranian arms came into Bosnia with the apparent tacit approval of the administration, in violation of U.N. sanctions. While publicly pressing Bosnian President Alia Izebegovic to purge remaining Islamist elements, the administration was loath to confront Sarajevo and Tehran over their presence.

Instead, Islamist groups went quietly underground as the windfall of weapons landed in their hands. They later joined up with a new Islamist center in Sofia established as a kind of rear guard by the al Zawahiri. Following the Zagreb arrest and extradition of renowned Egyptian militant Faud Qassim, an al Zawahiri favorite, the Sofia-based militants planned the deployment in Bosnia of terrorists capable of planning and leading possible major terrorist strikes against U.S. and SFOR facilities, according to al Fadl’s testimony to the House Task Force on Terrorism.

Islamist infiltration of the Kosovo Liberation Army advanced, meanwhile. Bin Laden is said to have visited Albania in 1996 and 1997, according to the murder-trial testimony of an Algerian-born French national, Claude Kader, himself an Afghanistan-trained mujahideen fronting at the Albanian-Arab Islamic Bank. He recruited some Albanians to fight with the KLA in Kosovo, according to the Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues.
This is, obviously, not the sort of concept one wants to start in the Balkans: the growing of the opium crop introduced by Afghan Islamic jihadist veterans so as to further fund and grow networks in the region. To understand how Islamic radicals got into this business, we can turn to an article by Darko Trifunovic at International Analyst Network from 20 JAN 2007 -Terrorism and Organized Crime in South-eastern Europe:
Heroin and other substances are abundant in BH – in restaurants, cafees, schools, universities – and general dissatisfaction with quality of life has enabled the crime syndicates to recruit users and pushers among the youth.

This recent situation is being exploited by various Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations in BH. During the civil war, some of the Muslim military commanders were petty criminals such as Ramiz Delalic – CELO1 (deputy commander, 9th Motorised Brig.), Ismet Bajramovic – CELO (Military police commander2), Musan Topalovic – CACO3 and Jusuf -Juka Prazina4. Also, members of the mentioned group are: Sead Becirevic-Sejo, Zulfikar Alic-Zuka (Military commander of the terrorist unit call Black Swans) and Bojadzic Nihat, former officer of the R BiH Army. Political support to this group secure on of the prominent Muslim politician in Sarajevo Mr.Ejup Ganic and Mr.Haris Silajdzic. Haris Silajdzic are the actual member of the B-H Presidency. His sister Salidza Silajdzic is married in Iran, presumably to a high rank officer of the VEVAK, and his brother Husref Silajdzic is thought to be a secret agent of the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI). New information speak about the fact that Haris Silajdzic is trying to restart the work of “Patriot League”.5 The center of “Patriot League” is to be in Sarajevo with General Vahid Karavelic as its head. They used patriotism as a cover for their criminal activities during the war.
Afterwards, however, a portion of the Muslim population in BH replaced nationalism with a new ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalists with a criminal background have substantial advantages in BH:1. fast and easy access to weapons and explosives; 2. in-depth knowledge of smuggling routes; 3. connections with corrupt officials and politicians; 4. influence in local media and NGOs; 5. connections with a large diaspora in the US and western Europe
Terrorist networks have seized upon these advantages of local criminals-turned-Islamic fundamentalists, creating a new model of terrorist funding.
Yes, they killed their way into the business or used 'converts' to supply them with credentials to get into it. Those initial connections dating back to the early 1990's for Iran and al Qaeda (or what was to become al Qaeda) allowed for the seeding of a much larger problem of 'separate' Islamic communities now festering in Bosnia. And because the war there destroyed so many records, these 'imports' can claim any number of things to stay there and claim 'citizenship', even if they do not deserve it.

The type of terrorism that represents this is two-fold:

A) Local - Use of threats, intimidation and bribery to gain power over local communities or subvert law enforcement.

B) Regional/Global - The use of overseas emigres to establish narcotics, theft, radical and terror cells and continue the supply chain of those things outwards.

Thus, from the UN Mission in Kosovo, seeing news round-ups that mention local terrorist cells or narcotics busts, like this one from 06 JAN 2003, is not surprising:
Police try to find killers of three Rugova's party officials

PRISTINA, Jan 5 (Tanjug) - Police in Pristina said on Sunday that the killers of three ethnic Albanians, who had formerly been KLA members and were Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) officials until their death, had not been arrested yet.

One of the KLA commanders, Tahir Zemaj, his son Emif and their relative Hasan Zemaj were killed near the Druri complex in Pec late on Saturday. Police said that the victims' car had been ambushed and that the identity of the killer(s) was unknown, despite the fact that several witnesses had been taken in.


Yugoslav police seize 44 kilos of heroin at Bulgarian border

BELGRADE, Jan 5 (AFP) - Yugoslav police on Sunday seized 44 kilograms of heroin, hidden in a car, at the Bulgarian border, the Beta news agency reported.

Two Bulgarian nationals were arrested when customs officials found the drugs, worth more than two million euros (dollars), hidden in a fake seat of the vehicle, the agency quoted local customs chief Ivan Dencev as saying.

The two Bulgarians said they had been en route to Germany, the agency said. The border between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is on the main Balkans drug smuggling route from central Asia to western Europe.


Bosnia presents report on arms factory's illegal trade with Iraq

Sarajevo/Banja Luka (dpa) - Bosnian Serb President Dragan Cavic on Saturday presented a report on the illegal export of military components to Iraq by a Bosnian Serb factory.

Speaking at a press conference in the Bosnian Serb capital Banja Luka, Cavic said that the 1,614 page report confirmed that the Bosnian Serb Orao factory was in severe breach of the United Nations arms embargo against Iraq.The Orao affair started in October 2002 after the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, following U.S. intelligence reports, conducted an unannounced search of Orao premises in the northern Bosnian Serb town of Bijeljina, finding evidence of the company's illegal trade with Iraq.

The evidence showed that the Orao factory was providing Iraq with spare parts needed to refurbish Soviet-era MiG 21 combat aircraft.

According to Cavic, an investigation launched last year discovered that the cooperation between Orao and Iraq started in 1997.

He said the Bosnian Serb civil authorities had not known about the illegal trade, but some high-positioned Bosnian Serb Army officers were directly involved in it.

The main organiser of the trade between Bosnian Serbs and Iraq was Yugoslav company Jugoimport.

Cavic said there were indications that companies from the Bosnian Moslem-Croat Federation, Yugoslavia and Croatia were also involved in illegal weapon trade with Iraq.
From low level terrorist 'hits' to narcotics busts to illegal arms supplies going to Saddam in Iraq, the entire gamut of terrorism melding with organized crime is seen in a single week's report from the region. This sort of thing continues on with $3.5 million in heroin stopped in Croatia on 16 JAN 2008 (UPI via NewsDaily) and the general feeling is summed up in this working paper on Human Security in Europe by Bojan Dobovsek:
Everything mentioned above lead us to the conclusion that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a lack of official data on organised crime. Meanwhile, established new state institutions and an increasing number of young criminologists are guarantee that in Bosnia the similar researches will be provided and its number will increase. Many Bosnia and Herzegovina’s journals have been saying there is nothing organized in Bosnia (not even one citizen’s element including nature, industry, sport, culture etc.) and it is nothing functioning as good as organised crime”. Every citizen who just one time a day watch TV news or read first page in newspaper or listen radio will notice how important and actual is the organized crime’s phenomenon. Many citizens are asking them selves why such big actuality of these phenomenon. The answer is coming out from rumours that: Bosnia is an after-war transit country, its politic power is present in the field of sport, culture and in the police, the country is divided into many cantons, smaller provinces, has not unique police who is working together over the whole country` s territory. It is not possible to precisely affirm what is the main reason for increasing development of organized crime but it seems to be rumour that police is not unique and it is not working like one, together over the whole territory. Beside that, powerful thesis is also the one, which has been written in the political magazine “Dani”, nb. 407, 11.4.2005 where president of court Branko Peric said: Every country has own its own mafia, but our mafia has its country.”15
And that is a problem as that organized crime also has an Islamic radical tinge to it that continues to work its way outwards, like with the trial of 15 Wahabi terrorist suspects in Serbia that came into Bosnia during the civil war and then continued to train there afterwards (AKI 14 JAN 2008). And from a HUMSEC working paper by Dejan Anastasijevic, we can see the outlines of terrorism, narcotics, arms production/supply and money transfers between the Balkans, Libya, Argentina, South Africa and further outwards.

That should round out part II for now, more to follow as I am able to compile it, but the overall concept of the GWOT involves much more than just terrorism and is linked to some of the most intractable problems of humankind that have plagued Nations for centuries.