Three organizations: one quagmire

We have heard a lot over the past few years about how first Afghanistan was going to be a 'quagmire' for military forces from the US and its Coalition there. Unfortunately the US, out of need due to inability to get large forces to Afghanistan, put in tiny forces with large throw-weight via airpower. For the first time since Alexander the Great used a small forces concept to move through the region, a foreign power has replicated that success. The nasty Afghan winter didn't show up, and when it finally *did*, a few years later, it was Canadian forces that went on the winter offensive... possibly for the first time *ever* in Afghanistan. Mind you that was counter-insurgency (COIN) work, not battlefield fighting. Still, the effects this year have been startling and built upon that success.

Then comes Iraq, the mother of all quagmires, apparently. The US had not fielded a similar size force for a few decades, and it did not have the deep manpower reserves of the previous forces in Vietnam, Korea, WWII and WWI. The force size was equivalent to that used in the Philippine-American war and with similar, almost eerily prescient, results: the main opposition collapsed quickly and the US was put into a COIN role for which it was unprepared. In the 1901-10 era of that previous COIN, the armed forces sustained more casualties from tropical diseases than from combat, and yet won through. That effort took a few years to get oriented, understand the societal milieu and then address it. There are *still* those in Mindanao that have hard feelings about not getting a separate Republic once the US left. Nearly a century of hard feelings and grudge, though softened over time, held because of the outlook that folks should work together in a Nation and not be Balkanized. So much for thanks on the multi-culti side of things: damned if you do, damned if you don't.

Americans, not bothering to learn any history of their Nation in wartime, have forgotten that experience, thus we have the same sort of editors, writers, thinkers and such decrying the venture in Iraq as they did the Philippines. Pretty much the same verbiage about 'American Empire' and 'lost cause' overseas. The 'Yellow Journalists' didn't put much of that out, but the 'respectible' elite newspapers and journals did, which also brings out an eerie tone of the modern era, save that there is no Nationalist media in the US anymore. So when the complaining and moaning about a 'quagmire in Iraq' started, one could only look to the modern re-orientation of combat forces to COIN and see the same parallel a century previous to this. The US Army, in particular, takes time to get its bearings when put down in a strange land to fight. It is the main battle force of the US and was once designed to take out the Soviet Union. The US Marine Corps., used to having to go anywhere and do anything on a moment's notice, held their history and training together on COIN, although it, too, needed a bit of updating for the modern era.

By not having a conscript military, the US invests its time and energy on those volunteering to take up military work as a profession. That is not understood *as* a profession by the other professional classes in America, and those classes tend to devolve military work as 'shooting and killing' only. That does happen, yes, and military conflict requires that the wilingness to counter an enemy with brutal means must be done for survival of one's own forces and to reach the goals of the Nation in such a conflict. Denigration of all other professional classes, but particularly in academia, has lowered the ability of the US population to understand military work and how it works. Without knowing the 'why' it is done the way it is, and 'how' things are achieved not *just* by killing, nearly an entire generation of Americans are left with very little concept of the utility and necessity of military power.

While the various critics and naysayers and pontificators put forward that Iraq was a 'quagmire' they refused to review or address the underlying structural changes going on in the armed forces due to the small forces victory in Afghanistan (a direct attribute of mountain warfare views) and within the US Army for Iraq. One thing that left many people scratching their heads is *why* Gen. Petraeus was taken out of the active combat theater and put at a 'desk job'. The man was *successful*, and that is his reward? So a bit of background before getting to the three groups stuck in an Iraqi quagmire is necessary.

Gen. Petraeus was sent to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). There he not only re-wrote the COIN concept and re-designed it, but he was in the #1 spot to give it the widest application possible. TRADOC drafts and creates all training and doctrine for the US Army and, as such, when Gen. Petraeus had a new COIN doctrine, it was immediately taken up and *applied* to training. Some of the other things going on at the time were also picked up and inculcated, such as the logistics force using high speed comms back to stateside training facilities to tell what sort of attacks they were seeing and good ways to counter them. That tactical knowledge was picked up at the training centers, examined, then put into real-time situations so that new methods and appraoches for combat protection could be designed. That was impossible before the late 1990's and came into its own during the early years of Iraq. Training shifted heavily from generic Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) to Iraq and Afghanistan specific training on how to deal with locals, language, religion and the differences in the MOUT situations and traditional combat in both areas.

The lesson is clear: the US Army kicks extremely successful individuals up to have the highest influence possible so as to spread success. It is not in his advanced degrees that Gen. Petraeus got put into TRADOC, it was for his ability to apply his knowledge and craft a successful strategic and tactical view for COIN that did that. His reward was to be the man to implement that across the entire theater of operations in Iraq. That is a merit-based reward system, not a nepotism or educational level based one. The US Army uses that, because success has a quantifiable meaning in successful operations and lives *saved* by not having to fight unnecessarily when other means will allow one to win. For all the modern aspects of this, the time scale is nearly the same in Iraq as it was in the Philippines with almost the same force size, the only difference being that in Iraq the native population is huge compared to the Philippines circa 1901.

Thus the three organizations that can't adapt to Iraq are now stuck in their own quagmires:

1) Mainstream Media (MSM) - We have learned over the last 6 years that anyone who has outprocessed before Afghanistan has no idea how the modern military works. Afghanistan is mountain warfare and highland warfare, even going into 'out of oxygen' warfare at very high altitudes. The long, hard lessons learned over centuries by Persians, British, Germans and Russians is that you do not take large forces through mountain terrain without securing the terrain via small force action *first*. Not only Afghanistan, but the rugged terrain of the Balkans and the Alps (alpine warfare), all lead to this one conclusion: large armies get stuck in unsecured mountain terrain and require the use of very small, very well adapted units to dislodge fighters. In Iraq the entire utilization of TRADOC and shifting the learning basis of the armed forces remains, to this day, unspoken and unresearched by the MSM.

By not giving the US population any idea of how COIN works and *why* it can fail and *how* it can fail, every single critic that has faulted the work of the armed forces, but particularly the US Army, has slandered them. For the first time in recorded history the Media is trying to fight the last war and the Army has adapted faster than the Media. Successful COIN work does not mean an *end* to the insurgency over-night: insurgencies will often drag on for a decade or two after it has lost any foothold in society. In this ignorance the US Academic professional class has shown their ineptitude and inability to actually move away from ideology and understand the use and utilization of force and the outcomes of same. Not only does academia not prepare students for 'real world jobs' it does not prepare them for the actual world itself. Together the aged retirees, hidebound media and ivory tower academics have joined forces to sink into a losing fight. They are now stuck in a quagmire of their own stupidity, and those unable to part with them when they spout nonsense are likewise stuck in that.

The difference between ignorance and stupidity, is that the first is cureable.

2) Al Qaeda - Yes, the nasty terrorists have found that they do not know how to counter small force mountain warfare forces nor how to counter large scale forces on flat terrain as part of an insurgency. By starting with outdated tactics and then trying to out-adapt their foes, the al Qaeda based insurgency has come face to face with a military force that not only adapts faster than the now defunct Red Army, but faster than most politicians, not to speak of terrorists. Terrorists waging illegitimate warfare lack the necessary infrastructure to maintain high levels of training and combat effectiveness over time. They can devise successful tactics, like how to create newer IEDs, but the application and utilization of those for a higher concern is scattered at best. Without donning uniforms, forming an organizational infrastructure, and inculcating the utilization of tactics to higher strategic goals, al Qaeda has learned 'the old fashioned way': did you survive trying something new? Did it work? Can we get you out of here to teach anyone else?

Bin Laden, himself, in his latest audiotape, now puts it out for all to hear, as seen at Strategypage (H/t - Instapundit):

October 27, 2007: On October 22nd, Osama bin Laden admitted that al Qaeda had lost its war in Iraq. In an audiotape speech titled "Message to the people of Iraq," bin Laden complains of disunity and poor use of resources. He admits that al Qaeda made mistakes, and that all Sunni Arabs must unite to defeat the foreigners and Shia Moslems. What bin Laden is most upset about is the large number of Sunni Arab terrorists who have switched sides in Iraq. This has actually been going on for a while. Tribal leaders and warlords in the west (Anbar province) have been turning on terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda, for several years. While bin Laden appeals for unity, he shows only a superficial appreciation of what is actually going on in Iraq.

Remember, just a couple of years ago Iraq was going to be where the infidel Americans were routed and the new Caliphate would begin. His knowledge of Iraq appears to be about the level of the MSM. He needs better INTEL and isn't getting it, just like the MSM.

Al Qaeda actually *does* have a force doctrine manual called The Management of Savagery, which puts forward a relatively straightforward concept of winning a terrorist started conflict on a global scale. The first is to find weak Nations and target ethnic or religious sub-populations, utilizing cash to gain acceptance and start destabilizing the Nation. Step two is to utilize violence to cause internal disorder and disarray, and do that so as to drive supporters to you. Third is to bring civil war to the Nation involved and to spread the instability to other groups in the Nation, utilizing backing now intra-Nation to do so. While doing that, spread instability across borders so as to make the problem more regional or more dispersed, depending on where target populations are located. Once an area is out of control of a government, institute Sharia law and schools and exploit the region to spread influence, back at step one.

Wash, rinse, repeat. In Iraq the al Qaeda organization had the Ansar affiliate that it sent Zarqawi to. Especially in Diyala province, but elsewhere, al Qaeda had existing ties and strengthened them after the US invasion of Iraq, this was Step One. At that point, to get funds to go after an extremely able opponent, ties with the ex-Ba'athist regime were made and al Qaeda settled down to brewing a civil war, this was Step Two. A funny thing happened on their way to Step Three: they ended up not being able to adjust their 'rough and ready' outlook to the highly tribal centered views of Iraq. Unlike in other parts of the Middle East or Africa, the Iraqis take their tribes damned seriously and killing tribal elders and force-marrying their daughters is a big 'no-no'. Zarqawi's tactics did not get directed just at the government, but at anyone that disagreed with him, which included his own power base in Iraq. By AUG-SEP 2006 the tribes started turning on al Qaeda and the 'managing of the savages' soon became the savages managing *them*, usually in lethal ways.

For the sophistication of their terrorist operations, al Qaeda has proven to be less adaptable *with* Arabs to the differences in Arab populations than the US Army has been with outsiders. That should have been a trump card for al Qaeda: ethnically known and religiously affiliated views should trump outsiders each and every time it is done. By being hidebound on societal tactics, al Qaeda started losing its tactical edge in the insurgency, to the point where their Ba'athist backers are starting to go after them, too. It appears that after shooting at *everyone* for so long, al Qaeda has the new experience of having *everyone* shoot at them.

3) Iran - Being a neighbor, Iran is stuck with Iraq but not the way that Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait are. Iran is looking not only to extend its hegemony to include Iraq, but also is growing desperate for sustainment of its petroleum cash flow. By 60% of the Iraqi population being Shia and having ties to the Shia community, many MSM pundits and academia put forth that it is 'natural' that Iran will gain the upper hand. Unfortunately they are not dealing with the actual hatred of the Iranian regime by a large number of Shia in Iraq. One of the largest communities to send *volunteers* for Saddam during the Iran/Iraq War was the Shia community, and they volunteered in droves. That, alone, has to say something about the strength of feelings there. Worse for Iran is that they are Persians and some 80% of Iraq is Arab, and they are not treating their Arab community(nor indeed any ethnic minority) well in Iran which their cousins over the border hear about directly. Iran also does not have the strong tribal affiliation set-up as seen in Iraq, which is also playing against their main pawn, Moqtada al-Sadr.

In trying to counter each of these things Iran is stumbling, and badly, in setting up a Hezbollah affiliate in Iraq. The strong differences between the elder Iraqi cleric, Ali al-Sistani, and Iran creates a strong religious outlook in opposition to Iran. Moqtada al-Sadr is proving not to be his father's son and only has a great ability for self-survival and a limited one for organizational capability. His clashes with the Badr Brigades (also supported by Iran) have proven to be a continuing source of heartache for both, and causing growing resentment in the general Shia population towards both. In trying to stir up dissension in the Shia community so as to exploit that, Iran is facing a community that is uniting against the Iranian pawns.

This is not in the standard playbook of Iran, which puts forward a multi-decade view for radical support. Really you want one, centralized and focused oranization to destabilize a country, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, not two that are quarreling with each other. So the only remedy is to send in your OWN forces under cover and... well, they are having problems now that native Persians are getting picked up in Iraq, which is causing further grief in the population with Iran, Badr organization and al-Sadr's JaM. Apparently a force to do the *right thing* and attack Americans is hitting other folks a bit more than planned, clashing with other front organizations and having problems gaining any new recruits to the cause. After that, shifting attacks against the government has proven to be a nasty surprise for Iran as the New Iraqi Army is now the lead element in Basra and a few other points along the border, and instead of al-Sadr destabilizing things by pulling out of the Shia dominated government, that government is now performing hard and fast outreach to the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. By supporting local 'concerned citizens' or 'police auxiliaries' or 'neighborhood watches', the Shia government is demonstrating that it understands and legitimizes the need for self-protection under National auspices. Yes, Iraqi Nationalism that is *not* Ba'athist Nationalism is the outcome of Iran's opportunistic support for insurgents. And the New Iraqi Army has picked up widespread Sunni Arab support after being seen, not as oppressors as many in the MSM and punditry predicted, but as helping to quell instability and stand up local government.

To make the New Iraqi Army less effective, Iran wanted to ensure that the Badr organization was pulled into it, lock, stock and barrel. Some parts were, indeed, pulled in... but the INTEL work of the US to find those with close attachment to Iran and helping the Iraqis to form their own martial justice system, has proven to be something that was unexpected by Iran. Arabs policing themselves in an Army! Even the Turks have problems with that! While it is no 'magic wand' to weed out the bad actors, it ensures that ALL bad actors have equal expectations of justice. Trying to counter corruption before it starts in the New Iraqi Army is the leading challenge of the Coalition. Getting it to stick is challenge two. Iran was, clearly, not expecting this, and thought that just like Lebanon, getting a few capable and competent turn-coats into the New Iraqi Army to destabilize and discredit it would be *easy*. The New Iraqi Army is only *majority* Shia Arab and includes all ethnicities, religions and outlooks in Iraq, and while there is common corruption rampant in the Middle East, the soldiers in the IA recognize that treating their own soldiers with respect and dignity, supplying them properly and building up esprit de corps is a long-term winner.

Clearly, Iran expected to operate a catspaw insider force and discredit the IA, Iraqi Police and Iraqi Government. Instead they are creating resentment of the interference, causing tribal strife to the point where the southern tribes are now starting to do as was done in Anbar, and, even worse, is that the IA is proving to be as effective as the Peshmerga, which have repulsed a few military operations from Iran into Iraq already. Trying to stir up ethnic differences and religious problems, exploit them and then gain power is similar to what al Qaeda does, although Iran has lots more money. Then there is the 'backflow' of money and help going to Baluchs, Arabs, Kurds and Azeris in Iran, which was absolutely not expected.


Each of these three have losing outlooks with regards to Iraq. And while the American people can't do much else about al Qaeda and Iran, because our government refuses to recognize them for the problems they are, we can and *should* start to hold the MSM, pundit class and academia heavily responsible for being so ill-adapted to the modern world that they can no longer describe it accurately.

Or at all, and just make up stories to fit their outlooks.

With the MSM Americans can vote by changing the channel or finding more reliable individuals for their information. As for academia, that is up to parents to decide on their actual support for school systems and higher education and its utility when Leftist ideology is stuck in a quagmire of its own making. As individuals and a society, we can and should hold academia and the media up to scrutiny and then vote to remove their support from government. Local seems to work best, and it is past time to get the Federal side out of local affairs so that the media and education can reflect society, not attempt to remake it.

An SOS from David Ignatius and the Democratic Party

After reading the column by David Ignatius in the WaPo (09 SEP 2007), there is only one phrase that comes immediately to mind, and that from Gen. Honore during Katrina:

Stuck on Stupid.

There is much in the way of wishful thinking and much in the way of plain stupidity, not to mention good old fashioned ignorance that he has put out, so it is time to dispel some of that once and for all. Before going on, however, I will say that the fate of Iraq is more and more in the hands of Iraqis right where it should be. They have created a constitution, which we may criticize but it is for them to work their way with it. They have abided by the vote of the majority to accept that constitution, which is democracy at work. They have elected a common government, for good or ill, that is filled with newly minted POLITICIANS. And since they are newly minted they have no idea how to work this 'democracy' business, and are finding out that it is harder than a dictatorship! Yes, strong man rule is extremely easy - safeguarding freedom and liberty via democracy is like working in a slaughterhouse and making sausage and then getting to muck out the sewers to analyze the results. That is why it is the best system around: properly done it has input, process and feedback... maybe... someday... in America, too!

So first up: the vaunted troop reduction! Enough to give a Leftist shakes to think of a Republican President actually drawing down troops in a far off land. Be that as it may, do you know what will actually guide that decision? The folks putting their lives on the line as they report back day after day, week after week, and tell of the advances and difficulties seen on the ground. Right now things are going relatively well and the multiple insurgent organizations (al Qaeda in Iraq, Sadr's Mehdi Army, Iranian 'Secret Cells' and various criminal gangs) are getting put down, taken out or just hauled into the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Rebuilding rates will also decide that, along with infrastructure projects. The Army Corps has an expected timeline for slowly replacing the entire electrical infrastructure of Iraq by 2012 with the majority of that paid by, yes, Iraqis. Those same insurgents may have figured out ways to thwart some security measures and stage a high level come-back. You never know with the billions of dollars Tehran has been throwing into terrorism. Time will tell.

Also, the second thing that will determine this? The Iraqi Army. Mr. Ignatius, further on, goes on to try and invalidate the Iraqi Army through the report that they will not be ready to take over things in 12-18 months at *least*. Do you know *why*? Whenever the amateurs talk tactics, like Mr. Ignatius, the professionals talk logistics, and it is that area that the Iraqi Army also needs to fully understand, comprehend, staff, train and pick up. This is an Army unready for fully autonomous work: it does not have the internal supply and logistics lines in place as of yet to fully work on their own.

Additionally their Officer Corps. does not have many individuals with a deep history of knowing how to run an Army well. They are getting some of the hardest, fastest, deadliest training on the planet that is killing them off at a high ratio compared to their US counterparts. What gets left, however, is a veteran, battle-hardened force that is no-nonsense and understands their job. As Iraqis learn to plough that into their training capability this makes the force self-sustaining and builds a competent Officer Corps. The metric for this is: how good is their Non-Commissioned Officer Corps? I examined the problems of creating an army before and that outlook still holds true. The type of question that one can ask on the Iraqi Army's progress is: How well are they doing at generating up a new Officer Corps that understands the nature of the force compared to the US drawdown once the draft was removed? It took the US, arguably, 15 years to recover from the draft and also change the structure and outlook of its forces. Those forces failed to even begin staging a hostage rescue attempt in 1979, and yet, by 1991, was fully ready to take to the field in Iraq.

So the Iraqi Army might take 12-18 months *more* to become autonomous enough to finally get its own supply systems down? This is a problem?

On the question of the integration of the Iraqi Army, I will point over to Michael Yon in Bless the Beasts and Children, Pt. 2. The IA 5ID is a trustworthy division, and I have heard similar of others, particularly 2ID. These are fully integrated units as the soldiers will attest to on the ground: Arabs, Kurds, Sunni, Shia, Yezidi, Turkomen, Assyrians... they are all IRAQIS FIRST. They have seen the slaughter of the innocents done by the insurgent terrorists, their units have been shifted around to give them a good taste of each of the insurgents, and 5ID was one of the first to stand up and these men are veterans who have seen what the killers in Iraq *do* to their children. THEIR CHILDREN.

Talking in lovely tones of 'soft separation', which Mr. Ignatius goes onto do, pointing to the vaunted wisdom of plagiarist Sen. Biden, is a paternal way of saying: 'You Iraqis don't really belong together.' Good job! Sounding colonialist, paternalistic and 'realistic' all at the same time! Just the sort of person that Osama bin Laden really rails against.

Instead the Iraqis have finally learned that the killers from outside allying with the ex-Ba'athist thugs and criminal elements actually *do* mean to kill or enslave Iraqis. So when he comes up with this lovely line, I really begin to wonder just which Iraq Mr. Ignatius is talking about:

If we agree with Petraeus that the tribal sheiks in Anbar and their U.S.-armed militias are the best hope in combating al-Qaeda, we have to accept that this will undermine the aspiration of training a national army that can unite Iraq's Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. Regional solutions, in the short run, are the enemy of national ones.

Do you mean that if I find a good way to ensure children get taught locally that I have slowed up the teaching of children across the Nation?

Do you mean that if my town has a township police force that it has automatically invalidated the FBI?

Do you mean that if my State has a police force that it has automatically made supporting a National Army impossible?

Has Mr. Ignatius ever heard of the word: federalism? Because, apparently, he has no idea of the meaning of 'local government'. The fact is that thousands of Iraqis from Anbar have been signing up for: the Iraqi Army, local police and neighborhood watches. This does not sound like a set of folks wanting a 'soft partition' of Iraq. In fact it sounds like Mr. Ignatius is looking to some 'realism' in foreign policy, which I addressed in this article about the end of the Unreal 'Realists' and I will pick up just after listing all the known tribes of Iraq:

And as one may have noticed these tribes are geographically dispersed with sections and sub-sections all over the map, so to speak and that trying to find a way to 'Divide Iraq' has about as much chance as 'dividing a fruitcake into nuts, dough and fruit after it has been mixed and baked'. Further if one wishes to know a bit more about this wondrous 'Parting of the Tribes' based on ethnicity one can see from this map of genealogy that things are not that simple.

While one can discern some things that might lead an individual in one direction of thought, note that this is basic GENEALOGY, not permanent HOMELAND. And since the shortened listing will not really fit well into something short of 1m resolution imagery for all of Iraq, a simplified view of the major tribes may help, but realize that the actual boundaries of the tribes are like an actual boundary of a SNEEZE.

And then, after these Great and Wise Thinkers of All Wars Chilly put their Awesome Powers of Insight into this Matter, then perhaps the Rest of Us can leave them while They Take Tea and mull this over. Because an Iraq that is *not* Federal and that has *no* commonality of Government will Fly Apart and make the Balkans look like a Minor Familial Feud in the Appalachians. A mere Hatfields and McCoys compared to what will happen in Iraq. A failed Nation State scenario winds up with NO NATION there and the entirety of the Tribal System or lack of same holding full and absolute force as the only cohesive force LEFT if a Government fails. And as this is something that Iran and al Qaeda are set up to take full advantage of, they will DO SO. The Grand Road to Islamic Empire will be STARTED because the US was unwilling to tough out a minor back alley brawl or two, and would run out on its friends.

Realpolitik in running from Viet Nam got the World millions dead in South Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos all due to the fact that such an ongoing fight wasn't seen as 'worth it' to the American People. It is the great thinkers like those of Realpolitik that let the USSR go into Afghanistan because they had so denuded the Nation of ability that it could NOT block them. You may remember Afghanistan as it served as an incubator for the next great threat to Freedom, Liberty and Nations.

It helped CREATE a Non-Nation State Actor that cannot be directly gotten by the Great Wisdom of all of Realpolitik. If they could not stop al Qaeda from forming nor find a way to fight it THEN and that encouraged it to grow, what makes anyone think that running from Iraq will come to ANY GOOD END AT ALL?

Because these are the exact, self-same bozos that got us INTO THIS MESS and they have ZERO idea of how to clean it up.

Yes, that *includes* Sen. Biden. And, apparently, a good swath of the Democratic Party at this point, that cannot put partisan politics aside and do any analysis of Iraq and, instead, rely upon old tropes and wisdom passed down from the 'Realists'. Because they are offering the simplistic solution, that is glib and quick to pass the lips... not the simple one of building society, democracy and helping those trodden under tyrannical rule to stand up on their own and then decide for THEMSELVES what to do. That will take some time.

It has been going over 60 years to get all the troops out of Japan and we *still* to this day have troops INSIDE Germany. And South Korea. And quite some few other places for long periods of time. Once we have finally helped to drive the killers out, helped to stand up an Army and also Air Force and brown water Navy, and given what aid is asked for to help get things running in Iraq at a level that Iraqis find acceptable, then we will, indeed, not be needed. Once they can control their own borders they will actually be ahead of the US on that score. If you want to see some real basket cases, look at Germany, still whimpering whenever we make any noises of relocating bases. Tell you what, lets pull out of Germany, free up our armed forces, give a longer rotation cycle to our troops and slowly get fresh troops into combat so they can understand what fighting terrorism is all about.

Someone has to do it. And I expect that the General and Ambassador will point the way forward from where we are to goals of a free Iraq able to make her own way in the world.

Congress is only barely holding on to supporting the Nation, at this point.

And not looking to find a way forward to success of liberty, freedom and democracy in what the Nation does is betrayal. We cannot run from this fight, not in Iraq nor anyplace. When America runs from her fights, liberty LOSES and tyranny WINS. Our political class used to understand that America is united in its stance overseas in foreign policy. That was true from the founding until the 1960's, and without it we now find ourselves in deadly danger of losing the meaning of both liberty and freedom. That was the fight handed to us by Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Paine... the Revolution did not end with the ending of the fighting then. I will not betray those who created this Nation by walking away from their views on mankind and the US.
Let us hope our clueless and incapable political class can remember that above mere partisanship.

The Soul of Iraq seen in its Army

I have taken the liberty of transcribing a video shot by Michael Yon during Operation Arrowhead Ripper, contained in his post on Bless the Beasts and Children, Part 2. This is the Iraqi commander of the unit that had found a mass grave which Mr. Yon reported on in Bless the Beasts and Children. I have done my best to transcribe it, but the sound quality of the original was not optimal for the interpreter and the area, and I may not have gotten it all. Still, what Captain Baker (or as one of Mr. Yon's commenters said, it is most likely either Bakr or Bakhir) says is something that should be heard far and wide in the Land of the Free:

Interview with Captain Baker
Scorpion Company Commander
5th Iraqi Army 3-2
Besides the graves of murdered Iraqis
in al Hamira Village near Baqubah
June 30, 2007 11:50am

[I]-Interpreter present, speaking.

CB[I] - ...like this block. There's a couple of families down there and we talks to them and they don't respond to us.

MY: ...are they afraid to talk...

CB[I]: He said they talk to the Muqtar.

MY: Have you found the Muqtar?

CB[I]: Yes.

MY: Is he helpful?

CB[I]: He said we talk to the Muqtar and he tell us... like he didn't cooperate very good with us, but he tell us some information about this palm grove. He said this palm grove is al Qaeda, never let anybody go through this palm grove.

Michael Yon: And you know...This village is Sunni village, yes?

Captain Baker: Yes Sunni village.

MY: And al Qaeda does kill Sunni people here in Baqubah, many times, yes?

CB[I]: He said they kill all the Iraqis they don't care if its Sunni or Shi'ites.

MY: Have you been catching or killing any of the al Qaeda yourself?

CB[I]: I've capture the assistant for Zarqawi, his right hand, KBS... who had accompanied him and I deliver him to Coalition forces... and the Coalition forces gave that person... he gave them information... we capture him... they gave him $50,000... he's on the wanted list for al Qaeda troops.

MY: Who did they give $50,000?

[I]: Uh, that info guy.

MY: Who did they give the 50,000?

[I]: Coalition forces gave him a gift $50,000...

[US Soldier off-camera]: the informant.

MY: Oh, the informant. Thank you. What happened to... I mean... was that the guy that helped to kill Zarqawi?

CB[I]: This information guy... the information guy... he got the money. He helped them all to capture the Zarqawi system.

MY: Were you there when Zarqawi was bombed?

CB[I]: Yes.

MY: Immediately?

CB[I]: I wasn't in the same spot that he get killed in... but I was in KBS and we got some active over there.

MY: Did you see Zarqawi after he was hit?

CB[I]: Yes.

MY: And what condition was he in?

CB[I]: He said... ah... the situation after Zarqawi killed in Despa[sp?] very good for us...

MY: You mean because of the local people?

[I]: Yes.

MY: And the local people... what? they gave you information?

CB[I]: That's right. After Zarqawi's been killed al Qaeda troops are lost their command and they're disappointed... nobody looked up to them anymore.

CB[I]: He said... they were broken for that... after about a month we capture a lot of headquarters of al Qaeda. And we capture... I told you... his assistant... his name is Abbas. His nickname is Abu Abdullah.

MY: And what happened to Abu Abdullah?

CB[I]: Coalition forces took and he's in Bukah [sp?] right now... jail.

MY: Where are you from in Iraq?

CB[I]: He says, I'm Iraqi... and I live up north in Kurdistan.

MY: Do they feel safe here?

CB[I]: [not catching the lead in]...be not a situation in Diyala... all the Kurds back there... back there... in Kurdistan and other places... I hope in this operation we can destroy all the insurgents and kill them.

MY: 15 people are Kurdish? How many people are in your company?

CB[I]: 103.

MY: 103...and mostly Sunni, Shia or...

CB[I]: He said we've got Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, we've got everybody.

MY: Even Christian, too?

CB[I]: No.

MY: (slight laugh) Not too many of those to go around.

CB[I]: He said but we've got...I..I.. have some friends in the Army that are Christian.

MY: Yes, and some Yazidi, sometimes even, yes?

CB[I]: Yeah, they got some Yazidi.

MY: In your company?

CB[I]: Yes.

MY: Everybody gets along well, or...?

CB[I]: He said that we don't have any problems in my Company, my Battalion, my Brigade, even my Division.

MY: How many other places have you fought besides Diyala?

CB[I]: He was in Fallujah... he was with the Marines...

MY: Ah... when was that?

CB[I]: 2004

MY: What month?

CB[I]: Its...ahhh... September. And most of my guys with me then...

MY: Did you stay for the big fight in November?

CB[I]: Yes. We stay until January 2005.

MY: So you were fighting very hard...

CB[I]: He said that this is the only Battalion that served every hour..

MY: Yes... yes only one Battalion, right, and most of the rest did not go or went home, yes?

CB[I]: He said that our... our Battalion is the only one that served for the fight against al Qaeda in Fallujah City. We've got other Battalions that served outside the City.

MY: Did you lose many soldiers?

CB[I]: I lost 3/4ths of them.

MY: During that fight?

[I]: Yes.

MY: Is there anything you want to tell the people in the United States?

CB[I]: I want to tell the people of the United States that look what al Qaeda do to our country. He said al Qaeda crimes in our country, in our villages, in our houses, they kill the children... they kill everybody... Sunni, Shia, Kurdi... they don't care who is... his religions or whats he belong to. The thing is we need to help... we need to cooperate from Coalition forces more than before to end all the terrorism in Iraq. And this is... I want to tell the people over there this picture is live and this myself... myself and my guys with dead bodies, its not anything fabric or something. This is nothing but al Qaeda crime to right. They do a horrible thing in our country.

MY: One last question and then I will turn off the camera... do you believe in a big Iraq first or a Kurdish first?

CB[I]: He said fully from the first I'm Iraqi. From the first.

MY: Thank you, sir.

Now, for those of you who don't understand what is surprising about this, let me remind you that there are quite some number of individuals who put forward that the New Iraqi Army is just a 'super Shia militia'. You know, absolutely divided by sect? That little meme has been going on for a few years now and it is time to finally end it. Captain Baker is quite far down the chain of command in the New Iraqi Army, a Company Commander. He is also in one of the longest serving, longest created units in the New Iraqi Army, that being 5ID or Iron Division. He has been in combat where 75% of his Company was shot out from under him in Fallujah, in 2004. Thus he has seen the New Iraqi Army pretty much from its start, and how it has developed over time. There are some salient points to note:

1) He works under a unified command structure which cares about the strength of Companies internal to a Division, but ensures that it is properly manned and equipped. The ease of the soldiers under his command points to their trust and confidence in him, and it is the easy trust and confidence seen in US Armed Forces: alert, competent, and yet ready to react when needs be to changes. Throughout the interview various members of the Company are seen 'at ease' and yet there is also a calm sense of duty as individuals move around. There is no evidence of furtiveness or wariness, but there is that of combat weariness and a certain sense of 'hollowness' by what they have seen.

2) Captain Baker readily tells of problems with local officials, and, yet, the help that can be garnered from them. In this case having the area they entered as an al Qaeda area, one that shouldn't be trespassed upon for the things they did there. The fact that they then went in means that they had confidence in themselves to handle whatever they found be it hard firefight or something far more grisly. The quietness of the men is more than just professionalism, although that is the underlying sense I get watching them. They have seen something quite nasty and they are not clamoring to tell this. This scene reminds me of some from the closing film shot in World War II, and the soldiers telling what they experienced. Captain Baker is doing the same - he is 'bearing witness'. Not just as a soldier, but as a man.

3) This unit, by being a long lasting one, has knowledge across the Division and would have seen many other units from other organizations at work within the New Iraqi Army. It has good and clear ideas about how the New Iraqi Army is constructed, how it is manned and how it functions as an Army. These are not men that you can easily hide things from, not on a large scale, and as they become veterans of combat, the smaller scale stuff is also harder to hide, unit to unit.

4) The fundamental statements that put to lie those wanting to paint the New Iraqi Army as a Shia puppet are those that address sectarianism and ethnicity. The New Iraqi Army is integrated in that form, also. Within Divisions it is impossible to hide by sectarian division: that becomes obvious to Company commanders when other units do not function as they should during combat due to sectarian outlook. That also goes for ethnicity. The primary thing is that these soldiers see themselves as Iraqi first. They come from across all of Iraq, and their friendships across units are not delimited by sect or religion or ethnicity.

5) To get to this point where there are fully integrated Companies within Divisions, there must be a unified command and training system that ensures that secular and ethnic divisions do not divide up the Army. Units that adhere overmuch to one sect and support one over another get seen by the integrated parts and reported. Every set of Armed Forces on the planet will always have 'bad apples' and 'problem units'. The ability of units to operate at minimal levels, however, requires some level of cooperation and functioning so that units support each other. This was a difficult thing to do, as seen by the description of the 2004 Fallujah combat. Not all Iraqi units arrived, or would fight. That was a problem, and yet those that did arrive actually did fight and they were highly successful. These units would also complain that the *other* units needed to follow their example. All 'green' units have problems in combat, and that was the case with the New Iraqi Army in 2004. That had to change as combat veterans are skilled, accomplished and capable individuals able to operate in a combat environment as a unit. Combat veteran units will not put up with slackers, this has been true across time, and requires reform in the Army system to get units to fight as part of a whole operation.

Today in 2007 we see that happening across Iraq. Therefore this has been solved as a problem. Iraq is a majority Arab Shia population and will have that disproportionately represented in their Armed Forces. If it was 'sectarian' or a 'super Shia militia' it would have strict segregation within it, deferential rules in place for 'favored' portions of the Army and would, indeed, act like any other Arab Army.

To those of you wondering why these things are important, I will point you to my article on Creating an Army. This is not an unknown concept and is easy to discern just by the patterns of events over time, and I described it *previously* with this post, and I will excerpt a bit of it so that you can get a feel for the process involved:

And rebuild in the small towns, villages and small cities that can be quieted and use new Iraqi forces in those *first* to let them taste combat. The large cities are 'holding actions'. Push all the rest of the Iraqi political, infrastructure and economic side *hard*. Very hard. Let the New Iraqi Army clean out the old ways of thought and begin to start something brand new: a non-partisan Civil Army based on merit. That will take years if not a couple of decades to stand up completely, but their entire 'spin-up' will start to get fighting forces on the ground and give them real combat experience. It takes a hell of a long time to make a capable, trustworthy and competent Army and those are not hallmarks of the Middle East.

Then, slowly, shift operations to the larger cities using mixed Iraqi and MNF troops to start letting the Iraqis take a hand and learn what this fight *takes*. Start to encroach on the cities from firmly held provinces, towns and smaller cities and work damned hard to win the tribes over to the Government side. By doing all of that, concentrating on the tribes, local governance, and competence for the New Iraqi Army, you have a formula that removes the hinterlands from an insurgency. Their violence gets concentrated, very telegenic and has no place else to go.

As Iraqi effectiveness increases, suddenly *more options* appear on how to handle the large cities. One can bring on a new force structure aimed at removing effectiveness from the insurgents and their ability to operate in a cohesive manner. From that 'peacemaking' troops can be sent in for final clear-out of disorganized insurgents partnered with police units and demonstrate effectiveness. Or a neighborhood by neighborhood cleansing could start, but that takes a lot of effective manpower and coordination. This was actually started in mid- to late-AUG 2006 and has been semi-successful in getting the more peaceful outer sections of Baghdad quieted. Or one could craft a 'dislodge and exploit' system that suddenly drops highly effective troops into the bad areas of cities to dislodge insurgents and then pick them off with fast mobile troops guided by overhead recon. Which is what we have now.

As you can see, any review of events would lead to seeing that something was going on with the New Iraqi Army, and the abilities shown in 2004 had changed dramatically *upwards* over time via a process of unit cycling to new areas. Captain Baker's unit needed a serious refit and sustainment period after losing 75-80 men, and here it is in 2007 fighting *again* and hard. At this level the United States Armed Forces have had NO equivalent losses as 75-80 men lost in one battle would get noticed because it is a huge loss for the force size the United States can field.

The effectiveness of the New Iraqi Army I have seen when I looked at Building the Mosaic of Iraq, which takes a wide swath of on-the-ground, first hand reporting by bloggers and examines what was going on there up to late last year. Here is a bit from Bill Ardolino from INDC Journal, when he was in Fallujah talking to a policeman there:

INDC: You mentioned that you hate the insurgents, is that just more now because you've been shot or did you have a different opinion of them before?

Mohammed: "They hit me and they also killed some of my family. Actually they killed my uncle who used to be an Iraqi Army soldier, and they killed him and burned his face. And then they actually started threatening us as well."

INDC: They burned his face?

Mohammed: "Yes. It's a substance called "tizar," it's like, acid. They put it in his face."

INDC: He was alive when they did this?

Mohammed: "Yes, he was alive. They burned him and stabbed him so many times, and also they shot him with bullets. And we found a note on him saying, 'The police and the army and the Americans are all the same.'

INDC: So they killed him because he was in the Iraqi Army?

Mohammed: "Yes. But we didn't tell any of these guys (the Iraqi police) around here (at the time) because they hated the Army as well."

INDC: So why do police hate the army?

Mohammed: "I think because the army actually liberated Fallujah, they work well, and they liberated Fallujah. And some of (the police) actually like (or liked) the insurgents."

"And the other thing would be because they are different (sects of Islam). But after the operations we started doing together, now we became like one and the same, we became like brothers."

INDC: The Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army?

Mohammed: "Yes. Now we became like brothers."

INDC: So how does the police work with the Iraqi Army when some of the police hate the IA's?

Mohammed: "Some bad guys used to be part of the police, but now they quit and ran to Syria. And actually in the JCC (American control room) they know (who) most of them (are)."

The rift between the IP's and IA's that Mohammed describes is accurate, as is the recent, though potentially transitory accord. After a recent set of operations where the Marines encouraged the police and army to work together, the Americans were surprised to find Shia IA's and Sunni IP's joking around with each other and hugging after a successful raid. As Gunnery Sergeant Jason Lawson put it, they were showing off captured insurgents "like kids comparing Halloween candy." Whether this amity will last is anyone's guess.

INDC: So who are the insurgents? Who are the people who are fighting stability? Are they locals?

Mohammed: "(Yes), almost all of them."

INDC: So why are local Fallujans fighting other Fallujans?

Mohammed: "Because the al Qaeda organization came to this city and controlled it so hard by killing. And some people here actually like killing and they liked Saddam Hussein as well, and I think the al Qaeda organization and Saddam Hussein are the same face."

INDC: What do you mean by "the same face," because Saddam was secular, he was not religious and al Qaeda is ...

Mohammed: "Because the language they use is killing. And the same people who used to be with Saddam, now they participate with the insurgency."

INDC: So their motivation for killing is what?

Mohammed: "Money and to be famous. And I think the first reason is to fight the American troops. They say, 'we can start from here and cross all the way to America to fight them.'"

From what we have seen this has not only stayed as a concept, this working together across sectarian lines, but remains to this day. The influx of Arab Sunnis from Anbar province will change the New Iraqi Army, but it is seen as already open to any Iraqi wanting to defend his Nation. And you don't get a choice of *who* you will defend in this: you defend the Nation of Iraq.

As happens with most Armies that work by basis of merit and competence, it begins to be seen as more competent and capable than the actual politicians trying to guide their Nation. This is true not only in Iraq but in the United States as well. And as Norvell B. De Atkine points out in Why Arab Armies Lose Wars, Armies fight as they train and are a reflection of their society. Apparently there is some underlying cohesiveness to Iraq, an integration to it on some low level that is not easily discerned by diplomats seeking to play the 'Great Game' of Nations and not reconcile themselves to dealing with the realities of the People in a Nation.

How do you know Iraq will come together?

Look at its Army.

It reflects the Nation of Iraq.

They do need training in the basics of how to make a government work, how to assure accountability within government, and how to find ways to drive out those people trying to drive a wedge into the Nation. They have never done this before, so the learning curve is damned steep. But they can succeed.

Look at their Army.

See the eyes of Captain Baker and ask yourself: 'What is the fate of those killers going after the innocents, the children and men and women of Iraq?'

The window onto the soul of Iraq can be seen through their Army.

And good men like Captain Baker and those he commands.

My thanks to Michael Yon and all the others doing the work the Hotel Lobby Media will not do to bring us a look into the eyes and soul of Iraq.